Blog Posts
Intellectual Property
Lost in 1957, Litigated in 2026: The Copyright Risks Hidden in Older Creative Works
Puerto Rican singer-songwriter Roy Brown spent decades setting the poems of celebrated nationalist poet Juan Antonio Corretjer to music. After Corretjer died in 1985, one of his heirs assigned the poems to Latin American Music Company (LAMCO), a music publisher that registered the works with the Copyright Office in 2000 and began claiming royalties on Brown's recordings. Brown sued, LAMCO countersued, and the parties have been in federal court in Puerto Rico for over twenty years across multiple rounds of litigation. The most recent chapter closed on August 12, when Judge María Antongiorgi-Jordán of the District of Puerto Rico issued a ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment – one which should be on the radar of anyone whose work involves older creative material. The dispute over twelve of the thirteen poems turned on the Copyright Act of 1909, which governed all creative works published before January 1, 1978. Under that statute, publishing a work without a proper copyright notice was fatal to copyright protection, as the work entered the public domain immediately, with no opportunity to fix the mistake. LAMCO and Corretjer's daughter, Consuelo, tried to avoid this result by invoking the "limited publication" doctrine, which provides that sharing copies only with a specifically select group, for a limited purpose, and without allowing further distribution does not trigger the notice requirement. Corretjer was a politically persecuted dissident under FBI surveillance, and the claimants argued he kept his manuscripts within only a trusted circle of allies. They supported that theory with an affidavit from an administrator who had no personal knowledge of any of the events at issue, but the administrator’s description of Corretjer, a political poet determined to reach as many sympathizers and spread his political ideas, undercut the claim that he was carefully restricting who could receive his work. The court granted summary judgment for Brown on all twelve poems. The thirteenth, "Boricua en la Luna" (a piece that functions as something close to a second national anthem for Puerto Rico), survived as a question for the jury. Brown claims Corretjer personally handed him the manuscript at a 1976 concert in Ponce and told him to set it to music. Under First Circuit law, this kind of exchange can establish an oral implied license. Even so, Brown is not out of the woods: issues regarding scope of permission remain, and an informal instruction to "set it to music" may not necessarily authorize decades of commercial recordings, printed lyrics, and album packaging. For clients in the music and arts space, this case illustrates two risks. Pre-1978 creative works are governed by a legal framework that offered no safety net for a missing copyright notice. If the notice was absent when the work was first published, the copyright was lost, and no subsequent registration could claw back the rights. Anyone acquiring or asserting rights in older material needs to examine the original publication history before assuming protection exists. The case also highlights the danger of relying on informal permissions. A verbal authorization granted in a concert hall fifty years ago, with no surviving witness and a principal who has since passed away, may end up before a jury rather than settling the question cleanly, and even a favorable verdict may leave the scope of those rights unresolved.
September 14, 2026
Intellectual Property
Pop Art Time Bomb: The Second Circuit's Ruling in Hayden v. Koons
In the late 1980s, American artist Michael Hayden created a Styrofoam serpent sculpture for Ilona Staller, the Italian adult film actress and parliament member better known as Cicciolina, to use as a prop during her live erotic performances. Hayden sold the work to Staller's production company in 1988 for approximately $900. A year later, Staller’s husband, American artist Jeff Koons, posed with Staller for a series of erotic photographs that would become Koons’ Made in Heaven series. Three of those works depicted Koons and Staller atop Hayden's sculpture, and they debuted at the 1990 Venice Biennale to what Hayden himself described in his complaint as a "media sensation and scandal" that "launched Koons into the art world's stratosphere." Hayden claims he did not discover any of this until 2019, when a news article about an unrelated Staller lawsuit caught his attention. He registered his copyright and sued Koons in December 2021. The case never reached the merits. The Copyright Act requires that infringement claims be filed within three years of when the copyright owner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the infringement. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, rejecting Hayden's argument that constructive discovery requires a plaintiff to have actual knowledge of specific triggering facts before the clock starts running. The court clarified that constructive discovery turns on a fact-intensive, objective inquiry into whether a reasonably diligent copyright holder, given all the surrounding circumstances, should have uncovered the infringement. Applying that standard, the panel found the answer here was obvious: Hayden lived in Italy for nearly three decades, was fluent in Italian, consumed Italian news daily, had a direct professional relationship with Staller, and was present in Italy during the very Biennale that made Koons internationally famous, with Staller prominently featured. The court was careful to note that its ruling does not create a "celebrity privilege" that automatically starts the limitations clock whenever a famous artist is involved. Fame is one factor among many, not a categorical rule. The practical lesson for copyright owners is sobering. A rights holder who ignores widespread, international coverage of allegedly infringing work does so at significant legal peril, regardless of whether they actually saw that coverage. Hayden's claim failed not because he sat on a known injury, but because the court concluded a reasonably diligent person in his position could not plausibly have missed it.
August 11, 2026
Intellectual Property
Danger Zone: Top Gun Heirs Ask Supreme Court to Rewrite the Rules on Copyright Similarity
When Ehud Yonay wrote "Top Guns" for California Magazine in 1983, an 11-page account of the Navy's elite fighter pilot training program, Paramount Pictures came calling almost immediately, licensing the rights, and using the article as the springboard for the 1986 blockbuster Top Gun. After Yonay's death in 2012, his heirs attempted to exercise a powerful but often-overlooked copyright tool: statutory termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203, which allow an author's heirs to reclaim copyright grants made during the author's lifetime after a statutory period has elapsed. When Paramount released Top Gun: Maverick in 2022 without compensating or crediting the Yonay estate, the heirs promptly sued for copyright infringement and breach of contract. A district court disposed of the case in 2024, granting Paramount’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in January 2026, holding that Maverick did not infringe the article because every meaningful similarity between the two works, the shared setting, the fighter-pilot culture, aerial training sequences, etc., reflected unprotectable facts about the real Top Gun program rather than any protected original expression from Yunay’s work. While courts ultimately resolved the § 203 claim forming the basis of the suit in the Yonay’s favor, confirming that the rights to the initial article reverted to them, the central legal battleground became "substantial similarity,” the established standard that copyright plaintiffs must satisfy to show that a defendant copied their original creative expression, as opposed to the underlying facts or ideas, which lie in the public domain. The Ninth Circuit applies a two-step approach to determine substantial similarity. First, an "extrinsic test" that dissects a work into its component parts, filters out unprotectable elements like facts and generic ideas, and compares what remains piece-by-piece. Only works that clear this analytical gauntlet proceed to an "intrinsic test,” a holistic, ordinary-observer assessment of overall similarity. The Yonays argued that the article's vivid language, innovative structure, and the distinctive way Yonay wove those elements into a coherent portrait of a fighter pilot’s life were all protectable, including under a "selection-and-arrangement" theory, which recognizes that an original combination of otherwise unprotectable elements can itself merit copyright protection. The Court disagreed; every similarity, the Court stated, either dissolved into uncopyrightable facts about the real program or evaporated into abstract narrative ideas too general to be owned (the "redemption of a hero," beauty and terror juxtaposed in aerial sequences). Thus, the Yonays' selection-and-arrangement theory failed because the narrative patterns they identified were storytelling conventions, not Yonay's original contribution. The Yonays are appealing the Ninth Circuit’s decision and are applying for certiorari to make their case before the Supreme Court, basing their appeal on a new theory highlighting a significant circuit split. While the Ninth Circuit requires plaintiffs to clear the extrinsic-dissection test before any holistic similarity assessment, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits consider overall similarity without the threshold hurdle. Should SCOTUS grant certiorari and find for the Yonays, the result may be a sea change in the way copyright analysis is handled in one of the busiest jurisdictions for such cases. The Second and Ninth Circuits handle the heaviest copyright dockets in the country, covering the publishing and entertainment capitals. Yet, rights holders face materially different legal standards depending on which coast their lawsuit lands. The Yonays’ petition frames this as a $2 trillion problem, invoking copyright-intensive industries' contribution to the national economy, and argues that the Ninth Circuit's approach effectively strips protection from works like Yonay's, where original expression is inseparable from journalism about real events. Whether the Court grants certiorari remains to be seen, but the petition puts a consequential question about how courts measure creative similarity directly on its radar.
August 3, 2026
Intellectual Property
AI Back in Court: MiniMax Studio’s “In your Pocket” Faces Hollywood Studios Copyright Infringement Claims
When an AI company markets its product as a "Hollywood studio in your pocket," it probably shouldn't be surprised when Hollywood lawyers come knocking. Such is the lot of MiniMax, a Shanghai-based tech company whose video and image generation platform, Hailuo AI, became the target of a joint copyright lawsuit filed by Disney, Universal, and Warner Bros. Discovery in a California federal court last fall. The studios' complaint alleges that Hailuo AI was built on a foundation of stolen intellectual property: that MiniMax scraped and trained its model on the studios' copyrighted films without permission, and that the resulting platform can generate eerily accurate, downloadable images and videos of characters like Darth Vader, Wonder Woman, and the Minions, all with MiniMax's own branding slapped on them, at the push of a button. The lawsuit raises two distinct types of copyright infringement claims. The first involves the AI's training: the argument that feeding a model copyrighted films without a license is itself an unauthorized reproduction of those works, regardless of what the model later produces. The second involves the AI's outputs: the finished videos and images that directly replicate protected characters. The studios also pursued a theory of contributory infringement, arguing that MiniMax didn't just passively enable infringement, but actively encouraged it. The company's own promotional materials featured generated clips of the studios' characters, and it sponsored tutorial videos walking users through how to produce content like "Spider-Man and Supergirl kissing in the park." On May 22, 2026, a federal judge denied MiniMax's motion to dismiss, rejecting both the company's claim that a U.S. court lacked authority over a Chinese defendant and its argument that the studios hadn't stated a viable legal claim. On the contributory infringement theory in particular, the court found the studios' allegations sufficient to proceed. The studios have framed the stakes in stark terms, warning that as generative AI advances, it's only a matter of time before these tools can produce full-length unauthorized films. While that outcome remains speculative, the core legal question the case will force courts to answer is concrete: can an AI company build a commercial product on copyrighted works it never licensed, and then profit from an output that reproduces those works on demand? If the studios prevail, the answer will reshape how AI developers approach content licensing and what rights holders can expect in return. For now, MiniMax's motion to dismiss has been denied, the parties are headed toward discovery, and the "Hollywood studio in your pocket" is facing the real Hollywood in court.
June 22, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
“Alright, Alright, Alright,” — Taylor’s Version. Taylor Swift follows Matthew McConnaughey’s Novel Approach to Using Trademark Rights to Enforce Against AI Impersonation
Ever eager to retain control over her masters and ensure that she “never goes out of style,” Taylor Swift is the latest public figure looking toward registration of sensory trademarks to protect her name and likeness in a roundabout way. On April 24, 2026, Taylor Swift's company, TAS Rights Management, filed three trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: two "sound marks" capturing her spoken voice (which include the language "Hey, it's Taylor" and "Hey, it's Taylor Swift") and one design mark consisting of a photograph of Swift performing onstage during The Eras Tour. This echoes our prior writing regarding similar applications filed by the actor, Matthew McConnaughey, as Swift’s applications represent the latest in a growing movement of public figures attempting to use trademark rights to protect their names and likenesses — most likely due to the increasing accessibility of AI technology, which can impersonate such figures. While sound marks have historically been used to protect iconic brand audio cues, like Netflix's "tu-dum", the MGM lion roar, or NBC's chimes, these public figures have attempted to apply the same framework for their spoken voices and image. This genuinely novel use of trademark law is as-of-yet untested, and Swift's motivation here is not hard to read, as her likeness has been used without permission in numerous AI-generated fakes, including by Meta's AI chatbots, in non-consensual pornographic images, and in false political endorsements shared during the 2024 presidential election. The legal theory underlying these filings is novel and creative precisely because existing law was never designed for this purpose. Under current U.S. law, a musician's recorded performances are protected by copyright law, while the unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person's name or likeness is addressed by state-level right-of-publicity statutes. Individual states, including New York and California, have right-of-publicity laws that prevent unauthorized commercial use of a person's name, image, and likeness (“NIL”), but trademark infringement claims can be filed in federal court, making them a potentially more powerful deterrent as those cases apply nationwide and are not dependent on individual states’ differing enforceability limitations. Most importantly, trademark enforcement doesn't just stop identical uses as copyright enforcement does. Rather, trademark enforcement is designed to protect a rights owner against anything "confusingly similar" to a registered mark. This is a meaningfully broader standard that could reach AI-generated content that approximates, but doesn't exactly replicate Swift's voice or appearance. Trademark claims also enhance the ability to obtain emergency injunctive relief and to recover damages against AI platforms themselves. However, these applications face an unsure road to registration. Trademark protection traditionally requires that the mark function as a source identifier (i.e., signaling to consumers the origin of a product or service) and it is far from settled whether a person's voice or image satisfies this standard. Historically, trademarks are not designed to protect an individual's general likeness, voice, or persona. Swift's filings may be best understood as a deliberate effort to layer additional federal remedies on top of existing right-of-publicity and copyright protections rather than a “cure-all” to the elusive offense of AI impersonation, the scale and sophistication of which is not subject to a single body of law. Whether these applications ultimately succeed, they reflect a broader and accelerating trend: public figures and their counsel actively searching for any available legal structure to fill the enforcement gap that generative AI has created. It is clear that Swift believes that she will continue to Party Like It's 1989™. image credit SockaGPhoto - stock.adobe.com
May 11, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
AI Copyright Litigation Continues as NVIDIA Training Data Case Moves Forward
A ruling earlier this month by Judge Jon S. Tigar in Nazemian et al. v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 4:24 cv 01454 JST (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 8, 2024), declining to dismiss key claims in the case following NVIDIA’s motion to throw out portions of the complaint, signals that courts continue to be reluctant to resolve copyright disputes concerning AI training and outputs at the pleading stage. The ongoing class action against NVIDIA demonstrates why disputes over AI training data sourcing will continue to shape copyright doctrine well beyond the first wave of generative AI cases. In Nazemian a class of authors, including Abdi Nazemian, Brian Keene, Stewart O’Nan, Susan Orlean, and Andre Dubus III, allege that Nvidia violated the Copyright Act by copying and storing unauthorized digital copies of their books to train its NeMo Megatron large language models, asserting claims for direct infringement, contributory and vicarious infringement, statutory damages, and injunctive relief. They also make claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, alleging removal of copyright management information. Central to the case are the plaintiffs’ allegations that NVIDIA’s training datasets incorporated pirated works sourced from “shadow libraries,” including Books3 (derived from Bibliotik), The Pile, SlimPajama, and Anna’s Archive, each of which allegedly contain massive numbers of unauthorized copies of copyrighted books. Unlike earlier AI disputes that focused on whether model outputs were substantially similar to copyrighted works, the Nazemian action frames infringement as complete at the point of copying of the inputs into the model when works were allegedly downloaded and retained, regardless of whether subsequent model training is transformative. In allowing the direct infringement and related claims to proceed, the court made clear that fair use presents a mixed question of law and fact not suited for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly where the provenance, scope, and scale of the copied materials remain disputed. The ruling ensured that NVIDIA would not obtain an early exit from the litigation and underscored that allegations of unlawful data acquisition alone can carry a complaint past the pleading stage. The Nazemian litigation sits within an expanding ecosystem of AI copyright cases, which at present comprises more than 50 such actions pending in U.S. federal courts, including actions involving Meta Platforms, Anthropic, and OpenAI. While recent fair‑use rulings have not stemmed the AI litigation tide, the legal discussion has shifted from abstract debates about innovation policy to examinations of data sourcing, internal decision‑making, and statutory compliance. Even as courts acknowledge that AI training may satisfy the “transformative use” inquiry, they continue to treat market harm, licensing markets, and unlawful acquisition as fact‑dependent questions. It appears that so long as AI developers rely on massive training data sets and courts remain skeptical of practices involving pirated or unlicensed sources, copyright litigation over AI training models will continue to pervade.
May 4, 2026
Intellectual Property
Knowing Isn’t Enough: The Supreme Court Redefines ISP Liability for Piracy
When users pirate music, movies, or other creative works online, the internet service provider (“ISP”) supplying their connection may know more than you might think. Companies like Cox Communications receive thousands of automated notices identifying exactly which subscriber accounts are associated with illegal downloading — in Cox’s case, such notices accrued over a period of two years. In Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment, decided March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court confronted a deceptively simple question: if an ISP knows a subscriber is using its service to steal copyrighted content and keeps providing that service anyway, is the ISP itself liable? A jury of the lower court said “yes,” issuing relief to the tune of roughly $1 billion. The Supreme Court has now unanimously reversed the jury’s decision, although the Justices aren’t in agreement with respect to their rationale and extent. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that an ISP can only be liable for contributing to its users' infringement if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, particularly in two narrow circumstances: 1) if the ISP actively encouraged the illegal activity, or 2) if the service itself was essentially designed for piracy. The Court found that Cox never promoted piracy and, in fact, issued warnings to and suspended infringing accounts. The majority made clear that simply knowing about infringement and failing to cut off service to every potential infringing account (and, indeed, the record suggests that Cox did not know with total particularity which accounts engaged in infringement) is not enough. Justice Sotomayor, concurring, agreed Cox was not liable but warned that the majority had gone too far in strictly defining only two theories of “intent.” She argued that the ruling diminishes the DMCA safe harbor, which was specifically designed to give ISPs an incentive to crack down on repeat infringers in exchange for legal protection. If ISPs can't be held liable regardless of the very strictly defined theories of intent, that no longer has material effect. Justice Jackson joined Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence. For technology providers, implementing procedures to warn against infringement, and even taking action such as suspending service, may successfully ward off secondary liability. For copyright holders, particularly in the music, film, and entertainment industries, this decision has the potential to present a significant setback for IP enforcement, as avenues for pressuring ISPs to police their networks have been substantially narrowed. Going forward, rights holders may need to focus enforcement efforts more directly on individual infringers or on platforms that actively facilitate piracy, rather than on the companies providing the underlying internet connections. While the decision is a major win for ISPs, the Sotomayor concurrence reasoning could signal that future litigation (or future legislation) may set new standards.
April 27, 2026
Intellectual Property
The Lion King Chant Roars Into Federal Court
Most people know the opening chant of Disney's "The Lion King," even if they can't quite place the words. That chant, "Nants'ingonyama bagithi Baba," was composed and originally performed in 1994 by Grammy-winning South African artist Lebohang Morake, known professionally as Lebo M. Its meaning, as published in the 2019 soundtrack liner notes, is a royal Xhosa proclamation: "All hail the king, we all bow in the presence of the king." On March 16, 2026, Lebo M filed a federal lawsuit in the Central District of California against Zimbabwean-born comedian Learnmore Jonasi, who told millions of podcast and social media viewers that the chant actually translates to "Look, there's a lion. Oh my god." The complaint, seeking over $20 million in damages, raises an unusual and provocative question: when does a comedian's viral joke cross the line into actionable harm to an artist's livelihood and legacy? The lawsuit brings four distinct claims. The first invokes Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, arguing that Jonasi's false "translation" amounts to a misleading description of Lebo M's commercially significant creative work. The remaining three claims concern state law: 1) defamation per se, alleging the joke implies that a celebrated, award-winning composition is meaningless gibberish; 2) trade libel, targeting the disparagement of the composition itself as a commercial product; and 3) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, based on Lebo M's concern that the viral mockery could jeopardize his decades-long working relationship with Disney. Notably, the complaint does not include a copyright infringement claim, as Jonasi never reproduced the composition itself. Therefore, the theory of harm here is reputational and commercial, not about unauthorized copying of protected works. Ultimately, the case will hinge on the tension between intellectual property protections and the First Amendment. Jonasi's legal team is likely to argue that a humorous riff on a song lyric's meaning is protected speech, comprising an opinion or parody, not a provably false "statement of fact" as defamation law requires. But the complaint lays groundwork to counter that defense: it alleges that Jonasi presented his translation in an informational podcast setting (as opposed to, for example, a stand-up special where such humor is expected as a matter of course), that Lebo M personally contacted Jonasi with the correct translation, and that Jonasi explicitly refused to retract. If the court finds those facts credible, the case for actual malice (and potentially significant damages) becomes much more compelling. For creators, brand owners, and anyone whose professional reputation is tied to a specific body of work, Morake v. Mwanyenyeka is a case worth watching as it develops.
April 6, 2026
Intellectual Property
Britney Spears' Music Catalog Sale Highlights Rise in IP Deals Across the Music Industry
Britney Spears is the latest cultural icon to monetize her intellectual property by selling the rights to her entire music catalog to publisher Primary Wave for an estimated $200 million. This landmark agreement encompasses over two decades of hits and underscores a surging industry trend in which creators convert the long-term value of their IP portfolios into immediate capital. Spears joins a growing list of major artists (including Bruce Springsteen, Bob Dylan, Justin Bieber, and Katy Perry) who have recently brokered massive nine-figure transfers of their publishing and recorded music rights. For artists evaluating their intellectual property strategy, liquidating a catalog offers compelling advantages. The chief and obvious benefit is the immediate, guaranteed lump-sum payout an artist receives, which protects the artist from the uncertainties of fluctuating streaming revenues and shifting market trends. Additionally, a sale relieves the artist and their heirs from the complex, ongoing administrative burdens of managing copyright rights, negotiating licensing deals, and auditing royalties. The firms that acquire these rights assume the responsibility of actively pitching the catalog for lucrative placements in film, television, and commercial branding, by using their resources to maximize the IP's reach. However, cashing out requires artists to make significant trade-offs, the most notable drawback being the forfeiture of long-term royalty streams. If the music's value spikes due to a viral trend or a high-profile placement, the publishing firm reaps the financial windfall, not the creator. Furthermore, artists often surrender the ultimate right to control how their work is commercialized, opening the door for their music to be licensed for campaigns or media they might otherwise have rejected. In today’s highly charged political climate, this trade-off is not insignificant. This monumental sales strategy highlights the immense, tangible value of a well-protected IP portfolio, illustrating the careful balance creators must strike between immediate financial certainty and the long-term stewardship of their brand.
March 2, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Actor Matthew McConaughey Registers Sensory Trademark “Alright, Alright, Alright” in Enforcement Effort Against AI Deepfakes
Well-known actor Matthew McConaughey has attracted headlines following the registration of a number of trademarks, not just related to brands with which he may be associated, but also those that address his pop-culture persona. Most interesting among these is McConaughey’s recent registration of the phrase "Alright, alright, alright," first uttered by the actor in the 1993 film Dazed and Confused, which has become strongly associated with the actor’s laid-back, Texas public image. McConaughey, however, has not only registered “Alright, Alright, Alright” as a trademark, but also as less common sensory marks. Sensory marks are trademarks that identify brands through senses other than just text or static logos. Well-known examples include the three-note (G-E-C) NBC Chimes, the MGM lion’s roar accompanying many well-known films, and the specific scent of Play-Doh. According to McConaughey’s legal team, the registration of these sensory marks and other recent registrations represents an attempt to enforce against the ever-increasing problem of AI-generated “deep fake” videos, in which celebrities or other well-known individuals are impersonated, in strikingly authentic fashion. The registration of “Alright, Alright, Alright,” (Reg. Nos. 7995951 and 8070191) as sensory marks, specifically, has the potential to represent a tactical shift in celebrity rights management. By securing federal trademark protection for the specific sound and motion of his delivery of the phrase, McConaughey attempts to move beyond the patchwork of state-level "right of publicity" laws. A federal trademark registration provides nationwide constructive notice of McConaughey’s ownership and creates a legal presumption that his distinct mannerisms and delivery of the phrase serve as source identifiers for the registered Class 09 goods and Class 41 entertainment services, which constitute his on-screen performance. In the context of AI, this allows his legal team to pursue infringement claims under the Lanham Act against entities using AI voice clones or deepfakes to endorse products. Unlike a right of publicity claim, which often requires proving the appropriation of one's "likeness," a trademark claim focuses on consumer confusion; specifically, whether an AI’s use of the catchphrase falsely suggests McConaughey’s sponsorship or approval. However, relying on trademark law to police AI has significant limitations. The primary hurdle is the "commercial use" requirement; trademark laws are designed to prevent consumer confusion in the marketplace, not to protect personal dignity. Consequently, this registration may be ineffective against non-commercial AI generations, such as artistic deepfakes, memes, or satire, which may be protected by the First Amendment or the doctrine of Fair Use. Ultimately, the scope of protection offered by these new registrations may be narrow. While McConaughey can now vigorously enforce against an AI creation saying “alright, alright, alright," this specific registration offers little recourse against an AI model mimicking his voice to say anything else. Infringers could potentially bypass this protection by simply creating AI content that avoids his registered catchphrases while still exploiting his vocal timbre and mannerisms. While this registration adds one weapon to his arsenal, it is likely a specific deterrent rather than a comprehensive shield against unauthorized digital exploitation.
January 26, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Embedded Videos — Fair Use or Infringement? What the Latest Court Decision Means for Publishers
In early December 2025, the Southern District of New York issued a decision in Level 12 Productions, LLC v. Mediaite, LLC. The holding highlights a growing risk for publishers and businesses that use embedded social media content in their online publications – a widely used practice among a multitude of media companies. This case concerns two videos created by journalist Brendan Gutenschwager, both of which are owned by Plaintiff Level 12 Productions. Defendant Mediaite embedded these videos in articles without obtaining licenses from the plaintiff. The first video showed an anti-immigration rally outside New York City’s Gracie Mansion; the second captured celebrity couple Chrissy Teigen and John Legend walking through a protest at a White House Correspondents’ Dinner. Mediaite’s use of the latter video also included commentary by pundit Megyn Kelly during the playing of the video. Both videos were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. Mediaite argued that its embedding of these videos did not constitute infringement under the Ninth Circuit’s “server test” and claimed its use was fair use. The Ninth Circuit’s “server test” doctrine holds that a website does not infringe when it embeds protected material hosted on a third-party server, because the site never creates or stores a copy of the work. Instead, a user’s browser is merely directed to retrieve it from its original source. In other words, embedded video is considered to be equivalent to linking to a source rather than a public display as defined by the Copyright Act. The Second Circuit has previously declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s server test in prior disputes involving similar uses of embedded video. Judge Vargas followed the Second Circuit’s precedent, rejecting the server test and reaffirming that embedded video constitutes a public display under 17 U.S.C. § 101 even if the content itself is hosted on a third-party server. Regarding fair use, the court reached different conclusions for the two videos. In video one, the court did not overturn the lower court’s holding, which found no fair use. For video two, however, the court held that Mediaite’s use was fair, since Mediaite embedded the copyright-protected video in a manner featuring Megyn Kelly’s commentary on the same, and thus the copyright-protected material was effectively transformed. The fact that media publishers cannot rely on the Ninth Circuit’s server test in the Second Circuit, while not surprising, remains significant, as it limits publishers’ ability to embed media in online publications without a license. On the other hand, this holding does little to affect either Circuit’s application of highly contextual fair use analyses. Courts will still look for a transformative purpose to establish that a use is fair. For publishers and media outlets, the takeaway is clear: audit your embedding practices and treat embedded social media content as you would any other copyrighted material. When in doubt, secure a license, especially if the embedded content is central to your story but not the subject of commentary.
January 9, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Termination Rights Under Scrutiny in Harper Lee Adaptation Cases as USCO Steps In
It’s said: “you never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view,” but the Dramatic Publishing Company (“DPC”) is not so interested in considering the point of view of the Harper Lee Estate in the disputes over the rights to produce stage adaptations of Lee’s seminal work, To Kill a Mockingbird. The suits center on the exercise of termination rights under Sections 203 and 304 of the U.S. Copyright Act, invoked by Harper Lee in 2011 to terminate the exclusive right granted to DPC in 1969 to create and license amateur stage adaptations of the novel, and whether a derivative work created prior to such a termination may continue to be licensed by the licensee. The Lee Estate seeks to terminate Lee’s 1969 grant of dramatic rights, however DPC argues that its adaptation constitutes a lawful derivative work created prior to the effective date of termination, thereby preserving its continued exploitation rights under the derivative works exception to Sections 203 and 304. This conflict places the parties at odds, in both the Second and Seventh Circuits, over the scope of the termination right and the durability of licenses which permit the creation of derivative works, pre-termination. The U.S. Copyright Office (“USCO”) weighed in on April 15, 2025, by amicus brief, saying “Terminate all the rights you want, but it’s a sin to expand a derivative post-termination.” Addressing the core legal issue, the USCO supported a narrow reading of the derivative works exception, warning that an expansive interpretation would erode the statutory policy underpinning termination rights. The brief emphasizes that post-termination exploitation of derivative works should be confined to uses that do not alter or expand upon the original derivative work, and that new derivative post-termination uses should remain unauthorized. The brief thus urges the courts to adopt an interpretation that protects the integrity and utility of Sections 203 and 304. This position reinforces the principle that termination rights are intended to give authors and their heirs a meaningful opportunity to renegotiate or reclaim control of their works. Note that Section 203 of the Copyright Act does not cut off the right of a former licensee to exploit lawfully created derivative works. Instead, the law specifically allows the continued use of derivative works prepared before the termination date. The termination only reverts the licensed rights to the original copyright owner and prevents the creation of new derivative works after the termination date. The result of these suits may drastically limit an author’s ability to control the use of derivatives versions of their works, provided such works were created during the original grant period. While we do not know when we can expect the Seventh and Second Circuits to issue their decisions, rest assured we will provide an update at that time. The USCO’s amicus brief echoes the rationale they employed when confirming their final rule regarding termination rights of songwriters under the Music Modernization Act in July 2024, which further reinforces the narrow interpretation of the derivative works exception advocated in the brief. While the rule addresses royalty distributions for, specifically, musical works (as opposed to other copyright-protected works), its underlying principle, that post-termination exploitation must not expand upon pre-existing derivative works, applies in this Harper Lee dispute. Here, DPC’s continued licensing of stage adaptations arguably constitutes an expansion of the original derivative work, especially if new productions introduce changes or reinterpretations. The Office’s rule affirms that termination rights are meant to restore meaningful control to authors and their heirs, and that derivative works created under an original grant should not serve as a perpetual license to innovate or profit post-termination. The principle underlying the USCO’s July 2024 rule lends weight to the Lee Estate’s position and may influence how courts assess the scope of permissible post-termination uses.
December 1, 2025
Commercial Litigation
D.C. District Judge Narrows Case Between E-Commerce Giants, Temu and Shein
In December 2023, Temu (operated by Whaleco Inc.), a general e-commerce platform specializing in drop-shipping resale goods sold at deep discounts, filed suit against Shein, a similarly structured fast-fashion clothing manufacturer. In their suit, Temu alleged that Shein perpetuates a "mafia-style" scheme to monopolize the fast-fashion market through supplier intimidation, trade secret theft, and abuse of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Temu claimed that Shein coerced Chinese suppliers, who provide the overwhelming majority of Temu’s inventory, into filing over 33,000 allegedly baseless copyright takedown notices on Temu’s website in order to disrupt Temu's operations. Shein countersued in August 2024, accusing Temu of encouraging sellers to infringe intellectual property rights, stealing Shein's trade secrets and product designs, and operating a counterfeiting-reliant business model. This battle between Shein and Temu reached a critical moment on September 30, 2025 when a district judge in the District of Columbia dismissed key claims of plaintiff Temu, while allowing Temu’s intellectual property claims to proceed. This recent ruling proved a strategic victory for Shein. The court dismissed Temu's antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, ruling that the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred in China and fell outside U.S. jurisdiction. The court dismissed Temu's trade secret claims for similar reasons, as the alleged theft of trade secrets occurred overseas. However, the court left Temu's intellectual property claims intact, finding that Temu adequately pleaded infringement of its trade dress by Shein, direct copyright infringement related to Temu’s promotional mobile phone games, and violations of DMCA Section 512(f) for knowingly issuing false copyright takedown notices. This case underscores critical challenges for companies operating in global e-commerce markets – especially as international drop shipping business models become increasingly ubiquitous. In particular, U.S. courts have faced increasing difficulty addressing allegedly anticompetitive conduct by overseas entities whose actions may still be felt in the U.S. Meanwhile, such actors continue to misuse DMCA takedown procedure to gain a competitive edge in the market rather than as an IP protection tool. As both companies face broader regulatory scrutiny worldwide (Temu recently paid $2 million to the FTC to settle INFORM Consumers Act violations), this case may influence how courts evaluate jurisdictional questions in international supply chain disputes and assess claims of DMCA abuse in competitive marketplaces.
October 27, 2025
Sports Entertainment and Media
From Cameo to Courtroom: George Santos’ Copyright Claims Fall Flat
Despite the best efforts of the government, George Santos refuses to leave the public eye – for now, at least. On September 15, 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of former Congressman George Santos' copyright infringement and state law claims against late night show host and comedian, Jimmy Kimmel, as well as the Walt Disney Company. The case arose from Kimmel's use of personalized videos on his late-night show, Jimmy Kimmel Live! that Santos created through the Cameo platform. Kimmel and his staff submitted paid requests to George Santos through the popular app, Cameo, in which notable public individuals record and send personalized messages in exchange for money. Kimmel proceeded to air these recordings on his late-night show as part of "Will Santos Say It?" segments, which mocked Santos' willingness to create content for money. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Fair Use doctrine barred the copyright claims, while the state law claims for breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and fraudulent inducement either failed on the merits or were preempted. On the copyright claims, the Second Circuit conducted a thorough fair use analysis under 17 U.S.C. § 107, focusing primarily on the transformative nature of Kimmel's use of the materials for satirical purposes. The court rejected Santos' argument that the use wasn't transformative because Kimmel had "instigated" the videos' creation, emphasizing that transformativeness is judged by what a reasonable observer would think rather than the subjective intent of either party creating the work at issue. The court found Kimmel's use was clearly transformative commentary and criticism, noting that while Santos claimed Kimmel’s purpose in soliciting the recordings was also to mock Santos and demonstrate Santos’ willingness to say absurd things for money, a reasonable observer would view the videos as conveying "feelings of hope, strength, perseverance, encouragement, and positivity." The court also found no harm to the market, since Kimmel's use didn't usurp Santos' market by offering a competing substitute. As for Santos’ state claims, the court affirmed their dismissal on substantive grounds. Santos' direct breach of contract claim failed because he was not considered a party to Cameo's Terms of Service and could not establish third-party beneficiary status under Illinois state law, which requires implied terms to a contract to be "so strong as to be practically an express declaration." His implied contract claim failed under New York law for not pleading essential contractual terms or demonstrating a meeting of the minds. Finally, his fraudulent inducement claim failed because he could not allege actual out-of-pocket losses as required under New York law. While Kimmel could have relied on commentary under Section 107 of the Copyright Act as a non-infringing use, this case reaffirms the power that satire also has to transform a work under the Fair Use doctrine. While deceit may not endear one to the deceiver, neither will it necessarily endanger them in a court of law (depending on the use, of course).
October 17, 2025
Sports Entertainment and Media
Neil Young and Backing Band Hit Like a Hurricane, Sued for Trademark Infringement by Luxury Jewelry Brand
Luxury jewelry and apparel brand, Chrome Hearts, LLC has filed a lawsuit against rock legend Neil Young and his current backing band, the Chrome Hearts, in the Central District of California, alleging that both the backing band’s use of the “CHROME HEARTS” phrase and Young's use of "Neil Young and the Chrome Hearts" on merchandise (NYTCH) generates significant consumer confusion in the market, and infringes Chrome Hearts' federally registered CHROME HEARTS trademarks. The complaint asserts five causes of action including, federal trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition under California law, and common law trademark infringement and unfair competition. Chrome Hearts, which has operated its brand since 1988, and frequently collaborates with well-known musicians, argues that Young's band’s incorporation of the exact CHROME HEARTS word mark on merchandise and promotional materials violates their federally protected rights. In support of their contention, Chrome Hearts alleges salient instances of actual confusion, strengthening the plaintiff’s allegations beyond mere hypotheticals. Per the complaint, multiple apparel vendors have already mistakenly assumed a connection between NYTCH and Chrome Hearts, strongly suggesting the consumer perception of a purported relationship between Chrome Hearts, Young, and his band. The complaint also includes images of specific instances of use of Chrome Hearts designs, or designs evocative of Chrome Hearts’ IP, by third party vendors adorning the t-shirts and other merchandise sold at Young’s concerts, even though Young’s official merchandise does not use Chrome Hearts’ registered designs. The complaint further alleges that Young and Co. had knowledge of the alleged infringement, as Chrome Hearts had sent multiple notice letters regarding this alleged misuse prior to filing suit. Chrome Hearts seeks aggressive relief including temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions to halt all use of the NYTCH name and Chrome Hearts marks, mandatory recall and destruction of infringing inventory, and damages including attorney fees. If Chrome Hearts’ allegations make it to trial, we will see whether Neil Young truly has a Heart of Gold, or whether this Old Man’s callous disregard for well-established intellectual property rights were left Down by the River back in 1969.
October 14, 2025
Sports Entertainment and Media
Court Reinstates Jury Finding in Disney Motion Capture Copyright Dispute
The Ninth Circuit recently issued a partial reversal of a grant of summary judgment to Disney in a dispute stemming from the misuse of motion capture software. This case arose when Disney's visual effects contractor, Digital Domain 3.0 “DD3,” allegedly used Rearden's copyrighted MOVA motion capture software without authorization during production of the 2017 Beauty and the Beast film. While a jury found Disney vicariously liable and awarded $250,638 in actual damages plus $345,098 in profits, the district court granted Disney's motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that Disney lacked the ability to supervise DD3's directly infringing conduct. The ability of Disney to supervise DD3’s misuse constitutes a necessary element of vicarious liability. The Ninth Circuit disagreed on appeal, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Disney had the practical ability to supervise and control DD3's conduct. The court rejected Disney's arguments that it was impractical to conduct due diligence on every piece of software used by vendors and that it had no way to identify the infringement, finding that the jury could reasonably conclude Disney had the reasonable ability to identify DD3's potentially infringing use of MOVA. However, the court affirmed the district court's decision to treat the jury's profit award as advisory, ruling that there is no jury trial right for profit remedies under the Copyright Act. This decision has the potential to motivate large studios such as Disney to rethink their due diligence obligations in cases involving large-scale productions with multiple vendors and complex technological workflows.
September 25, 2025
Intellectual Property
Lawsuit Against AI Giant Anthropic Settles
A class action copyright infringement lawsuit brought by U.S. authors against the AI company Anthropic has reached settlement, avoiding a trial set to begin in December. The class of plaintiff-authors alleged in the suit that Anthropic used millions of pirated books without authorization to train its popular Claude AI assistant. This case has had an unusual path to settlement, following a split opinion in June by Northern California District Judge, William Alsup. Alsup held that Anthropic's use of copyrighted works for AI training constituted fair use, but determined the company nonetheless violated copyright law by maintaining pirated books in a "central library" for use far beyond training purposes. This liability exposure, which could have potentially led to billions or even trillions of dollars in penalties assessed against Anthropic if the pending trial did not go its way, was likely the primary factor which drove Anthropic toward settlement. The settlement's broader impact on pending AI copyright litigation against other major defendants such as OpenAI, Microsoft, and Meta remains uncertain, as this landscape of copyright law remains largely unsettled. Just two days following Judge Alsup’s ruling, Northern California District Judge Vince Chhabria issued a somewhat contrasting opinion in a similar authors' lawsuit against Meta, which suggested that Meta's fair use defense held water. However, the judge suggested that the defense could fail if that suit’s plaintiffs adjusted their arguments to indicate AI models’ potential to flood the market with reproductions of the authors’ works. With dozens of AI copyright cases pending, the unpredictability surrounding these novel legal questions may either incentivize additional settlements or encourage defendants to hold out for potentially favorable precedential rulings. As authors, attorneys, executives, and judges alike continue to navigate this new copyright landscape, time will tell whether more AI companies follow in Anthropic’s footsteps and seek dispute resolution before trial.
September 11, 2025
Sports Entertainment and Media
Federal Court Rules SoundExchange Lacks Standing in SiriusXM Royalty Dispute
Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed SoundExchange's $150 million lawsuit against SiriusXM, finding that the performance rights organization lacks legal standing to pursue litigation against broadcasters. The August 7, 2025, decision centered on allegations by SoundExchange, a non-profit entity designated by Congress as the singular entity responsible for collecting and distributing digital performance royalties for sound recordings, that SiriusXM manipulated its revenue accounting to shortchange artists on royalties stemming from the company’s satellite radio services. SoundExchange based its suit primarily on Section 114 of the U.S. Copyright Act, and claims that the underpaid royalties by SiriusXM have climbed since filing the initial suit in 2023, now allegedly exceeding $400 million. Judge Buchwald's opinion concluded that while Section 114 of the Copyright Act designates SoundExchange as the authority for collecting and distributing digital performance royalties, Congress never explicitly granted the body a private right to enforce nonpayment through litigation —unlike Section 115 — which expressly confers similar litigation powers to The Mechanical Licensing Collective. Notably, Judge Buchwald did not specifically address the merits of SiriusXM’s alleged nonpayment, restricting analysis solely to the threshold issue related to Section 114 of the Copyright Act, potentially leaving a door ajar for further enforcement by SoundExchange. SoundExchange disputed the ruling, calling Judge Buchwald's interpretation "entirely wrong on the law" and argued that Congress's inclusion of the word "enforcement" in Section 114 necessarily implies litigation authority. The organization contends that being charged with collecting and distributing royalties without the ability to bring legal action against non-compliant licensees would undermine the entire statutory licensing framework's function and efficiency. SoundExchange also points to practical precedent, noting as well that SiriusXM has acknowledged in prior disputes that SoundExchange reserves the right to sue for compliance. The ruling may have broader implications beyond the immediate SiriusXM case, affecting SoundExchange's enforcement capabilities across the digital music industry, including pending lawsuits against Napster and Sonos for similar nonpayment. SoundExchange is considering an appeal to the Second Circuit and potentially filing actions in state courts to preserve its enforcement mechanisms. The case presents a fundamental question about Congressional intent in creating the modern digital music licensing framework and whether administrative efficiency requires corresponding enforcement authority, with the resolution likely to have lasting implications for the balance of power between streaming services and rights holders in the music industry.
August 20, 2025
Intellectual Property
Voice Actors Clear Early Legal Hurdle in AI Cloning Suit
Voice actors received a rare, if incomplete, victory against alleged AI infringers in a recent opinion from an SDNY judge in Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc. Voice actors Paul Lehrman and Linnea Sage filed an action against AI voiceover company Lovo, alleging the company used artificial intelligence to synthesize and sell unauthorized "clones" of their voices. Plaintiffs discovered their voices being used in YouTube videos and podcasts after they had been hired through the freelancing app, Fiverr, for what they believed were limited voice recording projects used for research purposes. The result is a case of first impression regarding AI voice cloning tech, asserting claims under New York civil rights and consumer protection laws, the Lanham Act, the Copyright Act, and various common law theories, including breach of contract, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition. Judge J. Paul Oetken issued a mixed ruling on Lovo's motion to dismiss, concluding that "for the most part, Plaintiffs have not stated cognizable claims under federal trademark and copyright law." The court explained that what plaintiffs sought was essentially "copyright protection for their voices" as abstract concepts rather than specific expressions, and that copyright "must concern the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves." However, the court did allow the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and right of publicity claims to proceed, finding that communications through Fiverr and the platform's terms of service supported their allegations that the voice recordings were used beyond the agreed scope. The court also moved claims under New York Civil Rights Law Sections 50 and 51 forward, stating that these state laws are "tailored to balance the unique interests at stake" in voice misappropriation cases. While the ruling represents a partial victory for the voice actors, it highlights significant gaps in federal intellectual property protections for AI-generated content and voice cloning technology. The court's decision suggests that voice actors and similar plaintiffs may find more success pursuing state law remedies for unauthorized AI voice cloning rather than relying on federal copyright protections.
August 6, 2025
Intellectual Property
Supreme Court to Hear Cox Communications Case on ISP Copyright Liability
On June 30, 2025, the Supreme Court accepted a petition for certiorari brought by Cox Communications, and denied one brought by Sony in the same matter, following the advice of Solicitor General Sauer. The dispute stems from a massive $1 billion copyright infringement verdict against Cox Communications, in which music publishers (including Sony, Universal, and Warner Music, among others) alleged that Cox was liable for the illegal distribution of 10,017 musical works by the ISPs subscribers. The Fourth Circuit previously affirmed a lower court’s ruling that Cox was liable to the plaintiff publishers for contributory infringement, while overturning the lower court’s finding of vicarious liability. As a result, both Cox and Sony filed competing petitions for certiorari seeking clarification from the Supreme Court regarding different aspects of ISP copyright liability. The Supreme Court will review two critical questions that could reshape how internet service providers handle copyright infringement. First, whether an ISP materially contributes to copyright infringement by continuing to provide internet access to particular subscribers after receiving notice that their accounts have been linked to active and ongoing copyright infringement. The Department of Justice noted this ruling creates "substantial tension" with a recent Supreme Court analysis of contributory liability in Twitter v. Taamneh, where the Court found that mere passive provision of services without active assistance doesn't constitute contributory liability. Second, the Court will examine the "circumstances under which a contributory infringer can be held liable for enhanced statutory damages based on a finding of "willful infringement,"" specifically whether knowledge of subscriber infringement alone suffices for a willfulness finding or if the ISP must have reasonably believed its own conduct violated copyright law. The decision could fundamentally alter how ISPs manage their networks and respond to copyright infringement notices, with Cox arguing that overly broad liability standards could jeopardize internet access for all Americans. Depending on the outcome of this case, American internet users may see ISPs tighten their grip when enforcing against pirate websites or unauthorized distributors of IP, as ISPs aim to minimize any and all liability potential. We will continue to keep this space updated as the case progresses.
July 11, 2025
Intellectual Property
Jimmy Page Accused of Infringing 'Dazed and Confused'
If the ongoing acrimony between Daryl Hall and John Oates wasn’t enough to fill the void of aging rock stars airing their grievances in court, never fear. There’s an endless well where that came from. Jake Holmes, original writer and composer of the song Dazed and Confused, has sued Led Zeppelin’s Jimmy Page, among other musical production and publishing entities, for damages related to a songwriting credit he feels he is owed. Indeed, Holmes wrote the now-iconic hit in 1967, at which time Jimmy Page heard the song and rearranged the composition for his then-outfit, The Yardbirds. Page would later work with Robert Plant to reimagine the song for their upstart band, Led Zeppelin, again neglecting to credit Holmes for his role in the song’s creation. Off the heels of a now-settled 2010 lawsuit regarding the issue, the recently released documentary, Becoming Led Zeppelin, has brought the song, and Holmes’ claims, back into public consciousness. Doubtless, Holmes wanted to strike while the iron is hot. Plaintiff Holmes filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, asserting three primary claims: two for copyright infringement and one for breach of contract. Holmes alleges he is the sole copyright owner of Dazed and Confused, originally registered in 1967. He claims that Jimmy Page and associated defendants, willfully infringed on this copyright by exploiting the composition without authorization—first in connection with the Yardbirds’ performances and later through its use in the 2025 documentary Becoming Led Zeppelin. Holmes's complaint alleges that, despite a 2011 settlement agreement (resolving the prior 2010 suit, which affirmed Holmes’s exclusive rights to the composition), Jimmy Page, Succubus Music Ltd., and WC Music Corp. continued to falsely license and monetize recordings of Dazed and Confused as if Page were the sole author. Holmes contends that these recordings include numerous Yardbirds live releases and that the defendants generated revenue from licensing, streaming, and royalties without proper attribution or payment to Holmes. Additionally, Holmes claims that the recent documentary film Becoming Led Zeppelin incorporated unauthorized performances of Dazed and Confused—both by the Yardbirds and by Led Zeppelin—again falsely crediting Page and excluding Holmes. He asserts that multiple defendants, including major production and distribution entities like Sony Pictures Classics and Big Beach LLC, participated in the infringing activity. Holmes seeks actual or statutory damages, injunctive relief, an accounting of profits, and attorneys' fees, alleging willful infringement and breach of the 2011 settlement agreement. This new action has the potential to set a standard for infringement cases regarding works so central to the infringing entity’s identity as to reframe that entity’s success completely. Time will tell whether Page’s Levee will finally Break, or whether Page and Zeppelin will Ramble On as they have for the past 50+ years.
May 28, 2025
