Blog Posts
Litigation
Creative Lawyering – Property Settlement Agreement as Written Assignment (a Supreme update)
A beneficiary’s interest in a life insurance policy is only as protected as the written assignment securing the interest with the policy issuer. In the right circumstances, a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) – or other similar agreement! – can double as any number of other useful legal documents. I’ve previously written of trial court successes where PSAs have doubled as a real property deed and, in a more recent case, as an “assignment” (serving to transfer an interest in life insurance policy proceeds). Over the pandemic, I left readers hanging by failing to share the appellate outcome on the “assignment” issue. The Virginia Supreme Court took up a case of mine involving a divorcee whose deceased ex-spouse failed to honor a consensually court-ordered life insurance commitment. Essentially, the divorcing husband had promised to maintain life insurance for the benefit of his soon-to-be ex-wife and later reneged by changing the policy beneficiary designation (a not uncommon occurrence, unfortunately) shortly before committing suicide. The trial court had ruled favorably for the surviving ex-spouse (our client) but had done so on questionable legal grounds – relying on a definition of “creditor,” which I had not even argued to the Court (with good reasons, it turns out!). Suffice it to say, the circumstances in the case required a “written assignment” for the proceeds of the life insurance policy to be rightfully owed to the surviving ex-spouse. The assignment requirement stemmed not from the former couple’s divorce documentation but rather from the contractual arrangement with the life insurance company issuing the policy. Additional details of the case aren’t nearly as significant as the rule of law on which the Supreme Court chose to uphold the trial court’s decision and the impact it ought to have on anyone expecting to benefit from the life insurance policy of another. It turns out the Supreme Court agreed that the language of the couple’s PSA satisfied all the requirements of an assignment sufficient to have effected a transfer of the policyholder’s interest in the proceeds of the policy to his ex-spouse. The appellate victory was sweet – not going to lie. Our client’s win, however, proved a cautionary tale for all future would-be policy beneficiaries (not to mention their divorce attorneys, financial planners, and estate planning counsel!) facing similar circumstances. Our client had lucked out inasmuch as her vengeful ex-spouse hadn’t compounded his in-your-face beneficiary re-designation by pledging or otherwise re-assigning the policy to another in exchange for a financial interest of some kind. According to the Supreme Court, had he done so, he would have successfully cut his ex-spouse out of a substantial portion of the financial consideration negotiated for during the parties’ divorce. Because the PSA/assignment document was not provided to and accepted as an assignment by the insurance company (in lieu of the company’s own form assignment document) prior to the policy owner’s death, any subsequent assignment properly documented with the insurance company would have superseded the PSA’s operative language. In essence, the reach of a PSA’s operative assignment impact only extends as far as the parties to the agreement unless and until either the policy issuer becomes a party to the agreement or the policy owner opts to reassign some or all the same interest in the proceeds. The rationale of the Court’s decision might easily be extended beyond the divorce context to anyone with an expectancy in policy proceeds. I’m speaking especially in this context to anyone who might consider extending credit with the promise of repayment to be backed by policy proceeds. Failing to insist on a written assignment on the insurer’s form and confirmation of the insurer’s acceptance of the assignment unnecessarily affords an unscrupulous borrower the ability to leave you completely unprotected. I welcome opportunities to provide guidance prior to leaving oneself or one’s client unnecessarily exposed and/or counsel when looking to extricate from unanticipated consequences after having failed to protect against them beforehand.
July 25, 2023
Estates and Trusts
“de facto” Wills and the Harmless Error Rule - Part 2
Virginia maintains a signature requirement even for “de facto” wills With its added signature requirement, Virginia’s version of the Harmless Error Rule differs materially from the proposed uniform version of the Rule. The first part of the Virginia statute, Section 64.2-404(A), expressly permits writings not executed in compliance with the statutory attestation requirements [i.e., without all the whistles and bells] to be admitted to probate under the relevant circumstances. It was and remains the primary purpose of the Harmless Error Rule’s adoption and continued application. Virginia’s version of the Rule adds the language of Section 64.2-404(B), which (except in two very discreet situations) refuses to protect as harmless error “compliance with any requirement for a testator’s signature” and, in this respect, differs materially from the uniform code provision. The uniform code’s version of the Harmless Error Rule would overlook as “harmless” in appropriate circumstances not only the attestation requirements but also the signature requirement itself. Virginia legislators were collectively unwilling to be nearly as forgiving in this regard. With the addition of Section 64.2-404(B) and its signature requirement, the General Assembly clearly circumscribed the list of potentially “harmless errors” capable of being overlooked to allow an otherwise non-compliant will document to be accepted for probate. In one of several litigated matters relating to the Estate of Marvin Sacks, an Arlington circuit judge had occasion to address multiple facets of the statute, including not only alterations to an existing will but also to the Section 64.2-404(B) signature requirement itself. At the threshold, the respondent in Sacks sought to prevent the probate of a “de facto will” by challenging the testator’s failure to execute the document in compliance with all the attestation whistles and bells. As the Arlington court recognized, however, although Section 64.2-404 specifically references a “testator’s signature” requirement, it would be self-defeating for the statute to require “execution” of the writing in question by the testator as would otherwise be mandated by Section 64.2-403 (i.e., the whistles and bells section). Had the General Assembly intended the “testator’s signature” reference in Section 64.2-404(B) to mean a document “executed in compliance with § 64.2-403,” they would have thereby negated the purpose of the Harmless Error Rule itself. Failure to satisfy the attestation whistles and bells can only be corrected if a judicial ruling is sought within one year from the testator’s death. The right afforded under the Harmless Error Rule statute to have a court intervene to deem a non-compliant will legally enforceable has a limited lifespan. The protections otherwise afforded under Section 64.2-404(B) only survive the testator by one year. There is no exception. With the addition of subpart B to the Harmless Error Rule statute, the General Assembly saw fit to impose a time limit, what is known as a statute of limitation, by which time a proponent of a non-compliant will could otherwise seek the help of the court in having such a will declared legally enforceable is limited to the first anniversary of the testator’s death. In other words, an attestation error, otherwise deemed harmless and correctable under the Rule, ceases to be harmless one year after death. What constitutes clear and convincing evidence in this context? Prior to the 2007 adoption of the Harmless Error Rule in Virginia, all wills and changes to wills had to meet all the statutory attestation whistles and bells to be legally enforceable. Section 64.2-404 opens the door to allowing potentially harmless errors from preventing enforceability but affords such allowances only if the proponent of a will without all the requisite whistles and bells meets an elevated burden of proof regarding the testator’s intentions reflected therein and the signature appearing thereon. So what evidence is needed to meet the elevated clear and convincing standard? I include here a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when evaluating whether a document without all the attestation whistles and bells might nevertheless be upheld as a “de facto” will. One should consider evidence of the following factors along with any other evidence tending to support or refute whether the document in question truly reflects the decedent’s testamentary intentions (and not merely draft considerations) at the time the document was made: (i) the preparation and signing of the document itself (how, where, and under what circumstances did the document come into being and/or come to be signed); (ii) witnesses to the de facto will (did they formally “witness” (i.e., sign) or were they mere coincidental observers); (iii) the temporal proximity of the de facto will to the onset of testator’s terminal condition or death; (iv) questions or concerns regarding capacity of the testator (including age of the testator and possible undue influence); (v) motivation(s) and/or (dis-)incentive(s) for the de facto will proponent to lie; (vi) the level of independence of the source of information to be considered; and (vii) the status of the documentation of testator’s most recent prior known testamentary disposition(s). Additionally, evidence of consistencies and/or inconsistencies with the following are all potentially relevant considerations as well: (i) the de facto will provision(s) compared to the testator’s previously articulated intentions; (ii) the manner of document creation compared to prior testamentary dispositions (e.g., typed or holographic; physical or mental impairments impacting writing); (iii) the manner of document creation compared to current changed circumstances (e.g., typed or holographic; physical or mental impairments impacting writing); and/or (iv) the manner of maintaining/storing the de facto will be compared to prior known testamentary disposition documentation (e.g., nightstand v. bank safe deposit box). 10 “clear and convincing” evidentiary factors: Testator Capacity/Undue Influence Testator Age/Health Signature Circumstances Witnessing Formalities Temporal Proximity – Will/Death Proponent’s Self-interestedness Source(s)’ Independence Prior Will(s) (In)consistencies – time, place, manner, and intent Finality When setting forth one’s intentions regarding the disposition of one’s property when one dies, certain formalities are expected to be followed, and with good reason. At least two witnesses together in the same place at the same time to observe the signing of a will is not an unreasonable expectation when the resulting document is intended to affect the disposition of property only upon the death of the person willing it to be so. It is, after all, for the testator’s own protection that we generally require all the whistles and bells, all the pomp and circumstance, associated with a formal will signing because the testator will not be around to answer questions about their intentions after they are dead – the only time the language of the will actually has any legal impact. When such formalities have all been adhered to, we can be sufficiently certain that the resulting document validly reflects with sufficient certainty the final wishes of the testator. The Harmless Error Rule, as set forth in Virginia Code Section 64.2-404, is there as a safety net for when things don’t always go exactly as planned or for circumstances when, despite the best of intentions, people make changes to a will without understanding or appreciating that any such edits might serve to nullify the formalities they had previously paid to achieve. This work is intended for the non-lawyer wondering whether to involve a lawyer in the preparation of one’s will or a change to one previously made (you absolutely should!) and for family members or friends of departed loved ones who discover a document which you think might or could have been an attempt by the dearly departed to express their testamentary wishes in a form and manner that may or may not be legally sufficient to be accepted as the final will of the decedent. If you happened upon this article while conducting online legal research on the subject, I commend you to the prior publication. The earlier piece was intended for legal practitioners, complete with case and statutory citations and cross-references to scholarly sources upon which I relied at the time. Since publishing the original work, I have continued to be involved in cases with ever-evolving fact patterns of situations where proponents and opponents legally battle over the legal enforceability of documents which may or may not have been intended as testamentary dispositions, i.e., will documents seeking to dispose of one’s property at death.
May 22, 2023
Estates and Trusts
“de facto” Wills and the Harmless Error Rule – Part One
This is the first of a two-part article on “de facto” wills based in substantial part on a piece I previously published several years ago in the Virginia State Bar’s Trusts and Estates Section Newsletter, Vol. 22 No. 13. In part one, I explain the basics of the statutory Harmless Error Rule and how when timely seeking a court’s application of the Rule, an otherwise non-compliant, legally deficient will might nevertheless be deemed to be legally enforceable in certain circumstances. Is a document that is not valid will capable of being deemed a will – a “de facto” will, if you will? Yes, a document intended to be a will, but failing to satisfy all the statutory requirements for being automatically accepted as such, might nevertheless be capable of being deemed a will in appropriate circumstances. To understand what I mean by a “de facto” will, it is first necessary to appreciate what it takes to be a valid will. Not every state applies the same test for recognizing a valid or “self-proving” will, i.e., a document that is legally accepted as a will without the need for any additional evidence. If all the necessary signature attestation requirements have been followed (for instance, notarized signatures, witnesses’ signatures, etc.) -- what I like to refer to simply as all of the attestation “whistles and bells,” a document will be accepted officially without the need for anyone to testify or otherwise establish the specifics as to how it was prepared, who was present at the time, etc. The will, in effect, proves itself! Not every document intended as a will meets all the statutory requirements, however. Formerly, a document intended as a will without all the whistles and bells was simply rejected as if it had never been written. Nowadays, with the adoption of the so-called “Harmless Error Rule,” or, simply, “the Rule,” an otherwise legally deficient document determined to have been intended as a will (or an improperly carried out change to an otherwise proper will) may be upheld as a valid testamentary disposition in certain circumstances. In other words, even if you screw it up, legally speaking, the law now allows for certain screw-ups to be overlooked or overcome with sufficient evidence as to what you really meant to do. Section 64.2-404 calls upon a will proponent to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing as or to accomplish one of several possible outcomes: adding to, altering, or revoking an existing will; making a new will; or reviving a previously revoked will in whole or in part. Virginia Code Section 64.2-404, derived from Section 2-503 of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), is Virginia’s enactment of the Harmless Error Rule. In effect, the Rule states that certain defects may be forgiven if sufficient proof can be shown at trial that the testator intended the faulty document to be the testator’s will. One seeking to have such a document upheld as a will, known as the “proponent” of the will, must present clear and convincing evidence to establish that the testator intended the document (or alteration) to effect a final testamentary disposition, that is to say, a transfer at death. A key word here is “final.” The actual statutory language allows a writing not executed with all the proper attestation whistles and bells to be admitted to probate as a will if it is supported by clear and convincing evidence of intentionality and finality. The purpose of the Rule is to allow a judge to excuse certain otherwise harmless errors in creating a will in much the same manner as has long been allowed for similar mistakes made with other important end-of-life documents such as with life insurance beneficiary designations, for example. Case studies and evidence considered during the development of the statutory Rule suggested that the remedial impact of the Rule would primarily apply in situations either where witness signatures were lacking or instances where the testator marks up an otherwise valid will (for example, inserting/adding a provision or crossing out one term or name and replacing or substituting another in its place). Let it be said here for emphasis -- one should not make such changes to a properly executed final will document. Don’t do it! As should be plain from context, doing so potentially invalidates the entire document. Minimally, it calls into question the finality of the document as a whole and raises questions as to the timing of the change, the capacity of the person at the time of making the change, and, absent proper witnessing, whether the change was made by the testator him- or herself (or perhaps with some form of “gun to the head” when doing so!). One of the key factors to be considered if a court is to be convinced that any missing whistle or bell is, in fact, harmless error is the extent to which the proponent can establish convincingly the circumstances at the time the testator created the less than perfect document or made any changes to an existing document. What about handwritten (or holographic) wills -- the exception to the exception? It is true that, at least in Virginia, a signed will prepared entirely in the handwriting of the testator is legally sufficient as a will, even without all the attestation whistles and bells. A fully handwritten will does not need to be witnessed or notarized to be valid and enforceable. Such an exception is still subject to burdens of proof imposed on the will’s proponent. For instance, a proponent of such a will faces the burden of establishing sufficiently that the handwriting and signature are that of the testator. In part 2, I will address Virginia’s non-uniform additions to the Harmless Error Rule (the signature requirement and one-year limitations period); what one might look for when trying to meet the heightened “clear and convincing” evidentiary burden. This work is intended for the non-lawyer wondering whether to involve a lawyer in the preparation of one’s will or a change to one previously made (you absolutely should!) and for family members or friends of departed loved ones who discover a document which you think might or could have been an attempt by the dearly departed to express their testamentary wishes in a form and manner that may or may not be legally sufficient to be accepted as the final will of the decedent. If you happened upon this article while conducting on-line legal research on the subject, I commend you to the prior publication. The earlier piece was intended for legal practitioners, complete with case and statutory citations and cross-references to scholarly sources upon which I relied at the time. Since publishing the original work, I have continued to be involved in cases with ever-evolving fact patterns of situations where proponents and opponents legally battle over the legal enforceability of documents which may or may not have been intended as testamentary dispositions, i.e., will documents seeking to dispose of one’s property at death.
April 27, 2023
Litigation
Beware Sellers . . . Caveat Emptor May Not Be All You Believe it to Be!
When it comes to buying residential real estate in Virginia, the doctrine of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware,” may not be as onerous as you think. I’ve had numerous potential clients come to me with horror stories of post-purchase discoveries or mishaps occurring shortly after buying a property. Appliances are breaking down, ceilings are collapsing, and water in the basement! – just to name a few. Generally speaking, there’s not a whole lot one can do about it other than get the problem fixed! If you’re smart, you’ve paid for a good homeowner’s insurance (always get an HO policy! and have it in effect the moment you take the title – if not sooner!). If you’re doubly smart, you insisted upon having a pre-purchase inspection (and bordering on brilliant if you did your homework and checked the credentials of your inspector!). You’re atop the smarts pyramid if, in addition to all that, you also managed to sign an agreement with your inspector in which you refused to limit your damages to whatever comparative pittance you might have paid the inspector (g’luck with that one!). Congratulations are still in order if you at least insisted on accompanying the inspector and insisted further that everything gets inspected as thoroughly as possible for the money (to each their own as to how far to take this one, but I suggest you consider the following before you decide the extent to which you take heed . . . . Believe it or not, not every home seller is completely above board when it comes to disclosing shortcomings. This may shock you, but some share less than the full truth about the foibles and/or outright problems with their soon-to-be-someone-else’s-money-pit of a home. In fact, some people lie! NO?! Yes. It’s one thing to be less than completely forthcoming; it is quite another to hide, mislead, deflect, cover-up, and/or outright deny problems that exist. “Have these pipes ever caused you any problems? Have you ever had any water issues in the basement? Any known cracks in the foundation? How’s the roof? Has the place ever been struck by lightning to your knowledge?” How a seller responds to these inquiries may very well provide a future legal cause of action against them, even if they have seen fit to try to protect themselves as sellers with anything and everything from a “caveat emptor” contract condition to an “as is, where is” clause, and a disavowal of any buyer’s reliance on absolutely anything the seller might have said prior to finalizing the deal. In fact, you can take it up another notch (turn the volume up to eleven, if you will!) and find that you might still have a claim against the sellers even if, after signing a contract with all of these seller protections, you only closed on the deal after having a professional inspector look to find any problems and fail to discover anything. Now, in the event of a major “miss” from your inspector, you might certainly want to get your money back for a negligent inspection, for sure! (And, hopefully, you were savvy enough in advance to have negotiated out of your typical “money back” liability cap on the inspection contract). The key to whether you have any reasonable expectation of recovery from the sellers is if they committed fraud in the process. You see, it’s one thing not to discover problems when you are actively looking for them; it’s another thing entirely when a seller purposefully covers them up and/or affirmatively takes steps to prevent the discovery of the problem altogether. In this regard, I was recently surprised to learn that such cover-up actions can themselves satisfy the “misstatement” element required to establish an actionable fraud claim. In other words, a seller need not affirmatively lie about a problem if acts to “put you off your guard,” i.e., to prevent you from discovering the true nature of the condition. Consider in this regard examples such as damage from an active water leak that gets covered up, painted over, re-plastered, etc.; a “new” roof that was cheaply/improperly installed (with no underlayment by unskilled day laborers); denied access to a problem area (a locked entrance to a boiler room where the allegedly/assuredly “brand new” boiler is located); or, perhaps, a covered-up, foundation wall crack (for instance, with water-absorbent, sawdust packed in the newly-walled over “renovations” – yup, it’s been done!). All of these present possible major problems and potentially unmanageable expenses (not to mention frustration and aggravation!) after the purchase. Should you even bother asking the sellers if any of these potential deal-breakers exist? Undoubtedly, yes. Perhaps they respond truthfully when asked. You won’t know if you don’t try. Alternatively, perhaps they lie and deny it. What then? Trust but verify! But if you do get taken for a ride, you may not be a defenseless victim. Fraudulently inducing someone into a real estate purchase may not only be actionable in particular circumstances, it might also include with it the recovery of legal fees – often the difference between being made whole with a successful case and not being able to afford to bring the case in the first place. So, caveat emptor, for sure . . . but to those would-be fraudsters thinking they can hide safely behind this good-faith seller’s protection, I say, “caveat venditor!” And to those believing themselves victimized, I say document the seemingly fraudulent statements and actions and have a qualified legal professional look before you opt to do nothing.
March 8, 2023
Litigation
Virginia’s 2023 Wage Hike – New Year, New Minimum!
Virginia is one of nine jurisdictions en route to a $15 minimum wage (or higher) by 2026. As it is, Virginia is one of nearly 30 states to affect an increase this year. The first of the year saw the Commonwealth’s previous minimum of $11 per hour -- which had only gone into effect at the beginning of 2022! -- bump up by another $1 to $12 per hour. By comparison here in the “DMV,” Virginia continues to lag its neighboring jurisdictions, Maryland and D.C., with the first of the year, Maryland’s minimum jumped from $12.50 to $13.25 per hour (for companies of certain minimum size – i.e., 15 or more employees), while D.C.’s $16.10 hourly rate comes in higher than all fifty states, many of which still abide by the federal minimum of $7.25, which has remained unchanged since 2009. Virginia’s increase is the latest in a series of step-ups scheduled to take effect in the Commonwealth between now and 2026. The minimum wage rate in Virginia recently climbed $1.50 per hour in 2021 and, after this year’s additional $1 per hour, is slated to increase again to $13.50 per hour in 2025 before reaching the targeted $15 per hour in 2026. That is, of course, so long as the most recent changes to Virginia’s Minimum Wage Act are not repealed or otherwise limited by the now Republican-controlled General Assembly. Keep a watchful eye out for attempted changes this legislative session to Code Section 40.1-28.10 as attempts are anticipated to try to walk back the increases or at least to “slow the roll.” Tipped employees, such as restaurant wait staff, continue to face a meager $2.13 per hour minimum but, with tips factored in, must meet the $12 per hour minimum rate. If you are a small business owner with questions about the new laws and your obligations regarding them, Offit Kurman has the resources to help. Not sure whether your workers are independent contractors or employees subject to the minimum wage requirements? Choosing to do nothing is still making a choice – and the wrong one could prove very costly in this context. If you’re uncertain whether and/or how this or any other new law (recreational cannabis, for instance?) might impact you or your business, let me get you connected with someone who can help.
February 15, 2023
