Blog Posts
Intellectual Property
Longclaw Loses Its Edge: Court Dismisses Game of Thrones Sword Copyright Claim
Jalic, Inc., the officially licensed maker of Game of Thrones prop replicas sold under its Valyrian Steel and Jalic Blades brands, sued more than twenty toy, costume, and novelty companies, accusing them of selling swords that copy “Longclaw,” the wolf-pommel blade (i.e., a sword with a decorative wolf’s head at the end of the handle) carried by Jon Snow in HBO's Game of Thrones series. One defendant, Windy Woman, Inc., doing business as Childish Tendencies, moved to dismiss. In September 2026, a federal court in the Eastern District of Tennessee granted that motion, finding that Jalic had not sufficiently asserted the elements of copyright infringement. The court's reasoning turned on the “Substantial Similarity” filtering test courts use to separate protectable expression from the unprotectable underlying idea. After taking judicial notice of the show's wide cultural reach to satisfy the access element, the court set aside every generic, functionally necessary sword feature (a hilt, a blade, a crossguard) as unprotectable “scenes a faire,” or elements so common to forms of expression that they are ineligible for copyright protection. It also set aside the concept of putting a wolf's head on a pommel; an idea which, however distinctive, sits outside copyright's reach, and, thus, protection attaches only to Jalic's particular form of expression of the wolf’s head. Comparing the exact contours, proportions, and detailing of Longclaw's specific wolf-head design with the accused sword, the court found the overlap too general for a reasonable observer to call the works substantially similar. For businesses that manufacture, license, or sell merchandise inspired by well-known franchises, or that compete in a crowded design category like fantasy weapons and collectibles, the ruling is a reminder that copyright protection reaches the specific way an idea gets rendered and generally not the broad concept behind it. A client accused of copying should ask what is simply generic to the category before conceding similarity, and a client protecting its own designs needs a record of the concrete, distinctive choices that separate its product from the idea behind it. The takeaway is: if you are careful to document the specific expressive detail that makes your product unique, that record, not the shared premise, is what may win the day.
October 8, 2026
Intellectual Property
Lost in 1957, Litigated in 2026: The Copyright Risks Hidden in Older Creative Works
Puerto Rican singer-songwriter Roy Brown spent decades setting the poems of celebrated nationalist poet Juan Antonio Corretjer to music. After Corretjer died in 1985, one of his heirs assigned the poems to Latin American Music Company (LAMCO), a music publisher that registered the works with the Copyright Office in 2000 and began claiming royalties on Brown's recordings. Brown sued, LAMCO countersued, and the parties have been in federal court in Puerto Rico for over twenty years across multiple rounds of litigation. The most recent chapter closed on August 12, when Judge María Antongiorgi-Jordán of the District of Puerto Rico issued a ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment – one which should be on the radar of anyone whose work involves older creative material. The dispute over twelve of the thirteen poems turned on the Copyright Act of 1909, which governed all creative works published before January 1, 1978. Under that statute, publishing a work without a proper copyright notice was fatal to copyright protection, as the work entered the public domain immediately, with no opportunity to fix the mistake. LAMCO and Corretjer's daughter, Consuelo, tried to avoid this result by invoking the "limited publication" doctrine, which provides that sharing copies only with a specifically select group, for a limited purpose, and without allowing further distribution does not trigger the notice requirement. Corretjer was a politically persecuted dissident under FBI surveillance, and the claimants argued he kept his manuscripts within only a trusted circle of allies. They supported that theory with an affidavit from an administrator who had no personal knowledge of any of the events at issue, but the administrator’s description of Corretjer, a political poet determined to reach as many sympathizers and spread his political ideas, undercut the claim that he was carefully restricting who could receive his work. The court granted summary judgment for Brown on all twelve poems. The thirteenth, "Boricua en la Luna" (a piece that functions as something close to a second national anthem for Puerto Rico), survived as a question for the jury. Brown claims Corretjer personally handed him the manuscript at a 1976 concert in Ponce and told him to set it to music. Under First Circuit law, this kind of exchange can establish an oral implied license. Even so, Brown is not out of the woods: issues regarding scope of permission remain, and an informal instruction to "set it to music" may not necessarily authorize decades of commercial recordings, printed lyrics, and album packaging. For clients in the music and arts space, this case illustrates two risks. Pre-1978 creative works are governed by a legal framework that offered no safety net for a missing copyright notice. If the notice was absent when the work was first published, the copyright was lost, and no subsequent registration could claw back the rights. Anyone acquiring or asserting rights in older material needs to examine the original publication history before assuming protection exists. The case also highlights the danger of relying on informal permissions. A verbal authorization granted in a concert hall fifty years ago, with no surviving witness and a principal who has since passed away, may end up before a jury rather than settling the question cleanly, and even a favorable verdict may leave the scope of those rights unresolved.
September 14, 2026
Intellectual Property
Pop Art Time Bomb: The Second Circuit's Ruling in Hayden v. Koons
In the late 1980s, American artist Michael Hayden created a Styrofoam serpent sculpture for Ilona Staller, the Italian adult film actress and parliament member better known as Cicciolina, to use as a prop during her live erotic performances. Hayden sold the work to Staller's production company in 1988 for approximately $900. A year later, Staller’s husband, American artist Jeff Koons, posed with Staller for a series of erotic photographs that would become Koons’ Made in Heaven series. Three of those works depicted Koons and Staller atop Hayden's sculpture, and they debuted at the 1990 Venice Biennale to what Hayden himself described in his complaint as a "media sensation and scandal" that "launched Koons into the art world's stratosphere." Hayden claims he did not discover any of this until 2019, when a news article about an unrelated Staller lawsuit caught his attention. He registered his copyright and sued Koons in December 2021. The case never reached the merits. The Copyright Act requires that infringement claims be filed within three years of when the copyright owner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the infringement. The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, rejecting Hayden's argument that constructive discovery requires a plaintiff to have actual knowledge of specific triggering facts before the clock starts running. The court clarified that constructive discovery turns on a fact-intensive, objective inquiry into whether a reasonably diligent copyright holder, given all the surrounding circumstances, should have uncovered the infringement. Applying that standard, the panel found the answer here was obvious: Hayden lived in Italy for nearly three decades, was fluent in Italian, consumed Italian news daily, had a direct professional relationship with Staller, and was present in Italy during the very Biennale that made Koons internationally famous, with Staller prominently featured. The court was careful to note that its ruling does not create a "celebrity privilege" that automatically starts the limitations clock whenever a famous artist is involved. Fame is one factor among many, not a categorical rule. The practical lesson for copyright owners is sobering. A rights holder who ignores widespread, international coverage of allegedly infringing work does so at significant legal peril, regardless of whether they actually saw that coverage. Hayden's claim failed not because he sat on a known injury, but because the court concluded a reasonably diligent person in his position could not plausibly have missed it.
August 11, 2026
Intellectual Property
Danger Zone: Top Gun Heirs Ask Supreme Court to Rewrite the Rules on Copyright Similarity
When Ehud Yonay wrote "Top Guns" for California Magazine in 1983, an 11-page account of the Navy's elite fighter pilot training program, Paramount Pictures came calling almost immediately, licensing the rights, and using the article as the springboard for the 1986 blockbuster Top Gun. After Yonay's death in 2012, his heirs attempted to exercise a powerful but often-overlooked copyright tool: statutory termination rights under 17 U.S.C. § 203, which allow an author's heirs to reclaim copyright grants made during the author's lifetime after a statutory period has elapsed. When Paramount released Top Gun: Maverick in 2022 without compensating or crediting the Yonay estate, the heirs promptly sued for copyright infringement and breach of contract. A district court disposed of the case in 2024, granting Paramount’s motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in January 2026, holding that Maverick did not infringe the article because every meaningful similarity between the two works, the shared setting, the fighter-pilot culture, aerial training sequences, etc., reflected unprotectable facts about the real Top Gun program rather than any protected original expression from Yunay’s work. While courts ultimately resolved the § 203 claim forming the basis of the suit in the Yonay’s favor, confirming that the rights to the initial article reverted to them, the central legal battleground became "substantial similarity,” the established standard that copyright plaintiffs must satisfy to show that a defendant copied their original creative expression, as opposed to the underlying facts or ideas, which lie in the public domain. The Ninth Circuit applies a two-step approach to determine substantial similarity. First, an "extrinsic test" that dissects a work into its component parts, filters out unprotectable elements like facts and generic ideas, and compares what remains piece-by-piece. Only works that clear this analytical gauntlet proceed to an "intrinsic test,” a holistic, ordinary-observer assessment of overall similarity. The Yonays argued that the article's vivid language, innovative structure, and the distinctive way Yonay wove those elements into a coherent portrait of a fighter pilot’s life were all protectable, including under a "selection-and-arrangement" theory, which recognizes that an original combination of otherwise unprotectable elements can itself merit copyright protection. The Court disagreed; every similarity, the Court stated, either dissolved into uncopyrightable facts about the real program or evaporated into abstract narrative ideas too general to be owned (the "redemption of a hero," beauty and terror juxtaposed in aerial sequences). Thus, the Yonays' selection-and-arrangement theory failed because the narrative patterns they identified were storytelling conventions, not Yonay's original contribution. The Yonays are appealing the Ninth Circuit’s decision and are applying for certiorari to make their case before the Supreme Court, basing their appeal on a new theory highlighting a significant circuit split. While the Ninth Circuit requires plaintiffs to clear the extrinsic-dissection test before any holistic similarity assessment, the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits consider overall similarity without the threshold hurdle. Should SCOTUS grant certiorari and find for the Yonays, the result may be a sea change in the way copyright analysis is handled in one of the busiest jurisdictions for such cases. The Second and Ninth Circuits handle the heaviest copyright dockets in the country, covering the publishing and entertainment capitals. Yet, rights holders face materially different legal standards depending on which coast their lawsuit lands. The Yonays’ petition frames this as a $2 trillion problem, invoking copyright-intensive industries' contribution to the national economy, and argues that the Ninth Circuit's approach effectively strips protection from works like Yonay's, where original expression is inseparable from journalism about real events. Whether the Court grants certiorari remains to be seen, but the petition puts a consequential question about how courts measure creative similarity directly on its radar.
August 3, 2026
Intellectual Property
AI Back in Court: MiniMax Studio’s “In your Pocket” Faces Hollywood Studios Copyright Infringement Claims
When an AI company markets its product as a "Hollywood studio in your pocket," it probably shouldn't be surprised when Hollywood lawyers come knocking. Such is the lot of MiniMax, a Shanghai-based tech company whose video and image generation platform, Hailuo AI, became the target of a joint copyright lawsuit filed by Disney, Universal, and Warner Bros. Discovery in a California federal court last fall. The studios' complaint alleges that Hailuo AI was built on a foundation of stolen intellectual property: that MiniMax scraped and trained its model on the studios' copyrighted films without permission, and that the resulting platform can generate eerily accurate, downloadable images and videos of characters like Darth Vader, Wonder Woman, and the Minions, all with MiniMax's own branding slapped on them, at the push of a button. The lawsuit raises two distinct types of copyright infringement claims. The first involves the AI's training: the argument that feeding a model copyrighted films without a license is itself an unauthorized reproduction of those works, regardless of what the model later produces. The second involves the AI's outputs: the finished videos and images that directly replicate protected characters. The studios also pursued a theory of contributory infringement, arguing that MiniMax didn't just passively enable infringement, but actively encouraged it. The company's own promotional materials featured generated clips of the studios' characters, and it sponsored tutorial videos walking users through how to produce content like "Spider-Man and Supergirl kissing in the park." On May 22, 2026, a federal judge denied MiniMax's motion to dismiss, rejecting both the company's claim that a U.S. court lacked authority over a Chinese defendant and its argument that the studios hadn't stated a viable legal claim. On the contributory infringement theory in particular, the court found the studios' allegations sufficient to proceed. The studios have framed the stakes in stark terms, warning that as generative AI advances, it's only a matter of time before these tools can produce full-length unauthorized films. While that outcome remains speculative, the core legal question the case will force courts to answer is concrete: can an AI company build a commercial product on copyrighted works it never licensed, and then profit from an output that reproduces those works on demand? If the studios prevail, the answer will reshape how AI developers approach content licensing and what rights holders can expect in return. For now, MiniMax's motion to dismiss has been denied, the parties are headed toward discovery, and the "Hollywood studio in your pocket" is facing the real Hollywood in court.
June 22, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
“Alright, Alright, Alright,” — Taylor’s Version. Taylor Swift follows Matthew McConnaughey’s Novel Approach to Using Trademark Rights to Enforce Against AI Impersonation
Ever eager to retain control over her masters and ensure that she “never goes out of style,” Taylor Swift is the latest public figure looking toward registration of sensory trademarks to protect her name and likeness in a roundabout way. On April 24, 2026, Taylor Swift's company, TAS Rights Management, filed three trademark applications with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: two "sound marks" capturing her spoken voice (which include the language "Hey, it's Taylor" and "Hey, it's Taylor Swift") and one design mark consisting of a photograph of Swift performing onstage during The Eras Tour. This echoes our prior writing regarding similar applications filed by the actor, Matthew McConnaughey, as Swift’s applications represent the latest in a growing movement of public figures attempting to use trademark rights to protect their names and likenesses — most likely due to the increasing accessibility of AI technology, which can impersonate such figures. While sound marks have historically been used to protect iconic brand audio cues, like Netflix's "tu-dum", the MGM lion roar, or NBC's chimes, these public figures have attempted to apply the same framework for their spoken voices and image. This genuinely novel use of trademark law is as-of-yet untested, and Swift's motivation here is not hard to read, as her likeness has been used without permission in numerous AI-generated fakes, including by Meta's AI chatbots, in non-consensual pornographic images, and in false political endorsements shared during the 2024 presidential election. The legal theory underlying these filings is novel and creative precisely because existing law was never designed for this purpose. Under current U.S. law, a musician's recorded performances are protected by copyright law, while the unauthorized commercial exploitation of a person's name or likeness is addressed by state-level right-of-publicity statutes. Individual states, including New York and California, have right-of-publicity laws that prevent unauthorized commercial use of a person's name, image, and likeness (“NIL”), but trademark infringement claims can be filed in federal court, making them a potentially more powerful deterrent as those cases apply nationwide and are not dependent on individual states’ differing enforceability limitations. Most importantly, trademark enforcement doesn't just stop identical uses as copyright enforcement does. Rather, trademark enforcement is designed to protect a rights owner against anything "confusingly similar" to a registered mark. This is a meaningfully broader standard that could reach AI-generated content that approximates, but doesn't exactly replicate Swift's voice or appearance. Trademark claims also enhance the ability to obtain emergency injunctive relief and to recover damages against AI platforms themselves. However, these applications face an unsure road to registration. Trademark protection traditionally requires that the mark function as a source identifier (i.e., signaling to consumers the origin of a product or service) and it is far from settled whether a person's voice or image satisfies this standard. Historically, trademarks are not designed to protect an individual's general likeness, voice, or persona. Swift's filings may be best understood as a deliberate effort to layer additional federal remedies on top of existing right-of-publicity and copyright protections rather than a “cure-all” to the elusive offense of AI impersonation, the scale and sophistication of which is not subject to a single body of law. Whether these applications ultimately succeed, they reflect a broader and accelerating trend: public figures and their counsel actively searching for any available legal structure to fill the enforcement gap that generative AI has created. It is clear that Swift believes that she will continue to Party Like It's 1989™. image credit SockaGPhoto - stock.adobe.com
May 11, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
AI Copyright Litigation Continues as NVIDIA Training Data Case Moves Forward
A ruling earlier this month by Judge Jon S. Tigar in Nazemian et al. v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 4:24 cv 01454 JST (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 8, 2024), declining to dismiss key claims in the case following NVIDIA’s motion to throw out portions of the complaint, signals that courts continue to be reluctant to resolve copyright disputes concerning AI training and outputs at the pleading stage. The ongoing class action against NVIDIA demonstrates why disputes over AI training data sourcing will continue to shape copyright doctrine well beyond the first wave of generative AI cases. In Nazemian a class of authors, including Abdi Nazemian, Brian Keene, Stewart O’Nan, Susan Orlean, and Andre Dubus III, allege that Nvidia violated the Copyright Act by copying and storing unauthorized digital copies of their books to train its NeMo Megatron large language models, asserting claims for direct infringement, contributory and vicarious infringement, statutory damages, and injunctive relief. They also make claims under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, alleging removal of copyright management information. Central to the case are the plaintiffs’ allegations that NVIDIA’s training datasets incorporated pirated works sourced from “shadow libraries,” including Books3 (derived from Bibliotik), The Pile, SlimPajama, and Anna’s Archive, each of which allegedly contain massive numbers of unauthorized copies of copyrighted books. Unlike earlier AI disputes that focused on whether model outputs were substantially similar to copyrighted works, the Nazemian action frames infringement as complete at the point of copying of the inputs into the model when works were allegedly downloaded and retained, regardless of whether subsequent model training is transformative. In allowing the direct infringement and related claims to proceed, the court made clear that fair use presents a mixed question of law and fact not suited for resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, particularly where the provenance, scope, and scale of the copied materials remain disputed. The ruling ensured that NVIDIA would not obtain an early exit from the litigation and underscored that allegations of unlawful data acquisition alone can carry a complaint past the pleading stage. The Nazemian litigation sits within an expanding ecosystem of AI copyright cases, which at present comprises more than 50 such actions pending in U.S. federal courts, including actions involving Meta Platforms, Anthropic, and OpenAI. While recent fair‑use rulings have not stemmed the AI litigation tide, the legal discussion has shifted from abstract debates about innovation policy to examinations of data sourcing, internal decision‑making, and statutory compliance. Even as courts acknowledge that AI training may satisfy the “transformative use” inquiry, they continue to treat market harm, licensing markets, and unlawful acquisition as fact‑dependent questions. It appears that so long as AI developers rely on massive training data sets and courts remain skeptical of practices involving pirated or unlicensed sources, copyright litigation over AI training models will continue to pervade.
May 4, 2026
Intellectual Property
Knowing Isn’t Enough: The Supreme Court Redefines ISP Liability for Piracy
When users pirate music, movies, or other creative works online, the internet service provider (“ISP”) supplying their connection may know more than you might think. Companies like Cox Communications receive thousands of automated notices identifying exactly which subscriber accounts are associated with illegal downloading — in Cox’s case, such notices accrued over a period of two years. In Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment, decided March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court confronted a deceptively simple question: if an ISP knows a subscriber is using its service to steal copyrighted content and keeps providing that service anyway, is the ISP itself liable? A jury of the lower court said “yes,” issuing relief to the tune of roughly $1 billion. The Supreme Court has now unanimously reversed the jury’s decision, although the Justices aren’t in agreement with respect to their rationale and extent. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that an ISP can only be liable for contributing to its users' infringement if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, particularly in two narrow circumstances: 1) if the ISP actively encouraged the illegal activity, or 2) if the service itself was essentially designed for piracy. The Court found that Cox never promoted piracy and, in fact, issued warnings to and suspended infringing accounts. The majority made clear that simply knowing about infringement and failing to cut off service to every potential infringing account (and, indeed, the record suggests that Cox did not know with total particularity which accounts engaged in infringement) is not enough. Justice Sotomayor, concurring, agreed Cox was not liable but warned that the majority had gone too far in strictly defining only two theories of “intent.” She argued that the ruling diminishes the DMCA safe harbor, which was specifically designed to give ISPs an incentive to crack down on repeat infringers in exchange for legal protection. If ISPs can't be held liable regardless of the very strictly defined theories of intent, that no longer has material effect. Justice Jackson joined Justice Sotomayor in her concurrence. For technology providers, implementing procedures to warn against infringement, and even taking action such as suspending service, may successfully ward off secondary liability. For copyright holders, particularly in the music, film, and entertainment industries, this decision has the potential to present a significant setback for IP enforcement, as avenues for pressuring ISPs to police their networks have been substantially narrowed. Going forward, rights holders may need to focus enforcement efforts more directly on individual infringers or on platforms that actively facilitate piracy, rather than on the companies providing the underlying internet connections. While the decision is a major win for ISPs, the Sotomayor concurrence reasoning could signal that future litigation (or future legislation) may set new standards.
April 27, 2026
Intellectual Property
The Lion King Chant Roars Into Federal Court
Most people know the opening chant of Disney's "The Lion King," even if they can't quite place the words. That chant, "Nants'ingonyama bagithi Baba," was composed and originally performed in 1994 by Grammy-winning South African artist Lebohang Morake, known professionally as Lebo M. Its meaning, as published in the 2019 soundtrack liner notes, is a royal Xhosa proclamation: "All hail the king, we all bow in the presence of the king." On March 16, 2026, Lebo M filed a federal lawsuit in the Central District of California against Zimbabwean-born comedian Learnmore Jonasi, who told millions of podcast and social media viewers that the chant actually translates to "Look, there's a lion. Oh my god." The complaint, seeking over $20 million in damages, raises an unusual and provocative question: when does a comedian's viral joke cross the line into actionable harm to an artist's livelihood and legacy? The lawsuit brings four distinct claims. The first invokes Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, arguing that Jonasi's false "translation" amounts to a misleading description of Lebo M's commercially significant creative work. The remaining three claims concern state law: 1) defamation per se, alleging the joke implies that a celebrated, award-winning composition is meaningless gibberish; 2) trade libel, targeting the disparagement of the composition itself as a commercial product; and 3) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, based on Lebo M's concern that the viral mockery could jeopardize his decades-long working relationship with Disney. Notably, the complaint does not include a copyright infringement claim, as Jonasi never reproduced the composition itself. Therefore, the theory of harm here is reputational and commercial, not about unauthorized copying of protected works. Ultimately, the case will hinge on the tension between intellectual property protections and the First Amendment. Jonasi's legal team is likely to argue that a humorous riff on a song lyric's meaning is protected speech, comprising an opinion or parody, not a provably false "statement of fact" as defamation law requires. But the complaint lays groundwork to counter that defense: it alleges that Jonasi presented his translation in an informational podcast setting (as opposed to, for example, a stand-up special where such humor is expected as a matter of course), that Lebo M personally contacted Jonasi with the correct translation, and that Jonasi explicitly refused to retract. If the court finds those facts credible, the case for actual malice (and potentially significant damages) becomes much more compelling. For creators, brand owners, and anyone whose professional reputation is tied to a specific body of work, Morake v. Mwanyenyeka is a case worth watching as it develops.
April 6, 2026
Intellectual Property
Britney Spears' Music Catalog Sale Highlights Rise in IP Deals Across the Music Industry
Britney Spears is the latest cultural icon to monetize her intellectual property by selling the rights to her entire music catalog to publisher Primary Wave for an estimated $200 million. This landmark agreement encompasses over two decades of hits and underscores a surging industry trend in which creators convert the long-term value of their IP portfolios into immediate capital. Spears joins a growing list of major artists (including Bruce Springsteen, Bob Dylan, Justin Bieber, and Katy Perry) who have recently brokered massive nine-figure transfers of their publishing and recorded music rights. For artists evaluating their intellectual property strategy, liquidating a catalog offers compelling advantages. The chief and obvious benefit is the immediate, guaranteed lump-sum payout an artist receives, which protects the artist from the uncertainties of fluctuating streaming revenues and shifting market trends. Additionally, a sale relieves the artist and their heirs from the complex, ongoing administrative burdens of managing copyright rights, negotiating licensing deals, and auditing royalties. The firms that acquire these rights assume the responsibility of actively pitching the catalog for lucrative placements in film, television, and commercial branding, by using their resources to maximize the IP's reach. However, cashing out requires artists to make significant trade-offs, the most notable drawback being the forfeiture of long-term royalty streams. If the music's value spikes due to a viral trend or a high-profile placement, the publishing firm reaps the financial windfall, not the creator. Furthermore, artists often surrender the ultimate right to control how their work is commercialized, opening the door for their music to be licensed for campaigns or media they might otherwise have rejected. In today’s highly charged political climate, this trade-off is not insignificant. This monumental sales strategy highlights the immense, tangible value of a well-protected IP portfolio, illustrating the careful balance creators must strike between immediate financial certainty and the long-term stewardship of their brand.
March 2, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Actor Matthew McConaughey Registers Sensory Trademark “Alright, Alright, Alright” in Enforcement Effort Against AI Deepfakes
Well-known actor Matthew McConaughey has attracted headlines following the registration of a number of trademarks, not just related to brands with which he may be associated, but also those that address his pop-culture persona. Most interesting among these is McConaughey’s recent registration of the phrase "Alright, alright, alright," first uttered by the actor in the 1993 film Dazed and Confused, which has become strongly associated with the actor’s laid-back, Texas public image. McConaughey, however, has not only registered “Alright, Alright, Alright” as a trademark, but also as less common sensory marks. Sensory marks are trademarks that identify brands through senses other than just text or static logos. Well-known examples include the three-note (G-E-C) NBC Chimes, the MGM lion’s roar accompanying many well-known films, and the specific scent of Play-Doh. According to McConaughey’s legal team, the registration of these sensory marks and other recent registrations represents an attempt to enforce against the ever-increasing problem of AI-generated “deep fake” videos, in which celebrities or other well-known individuals are impersonated, in strikingly authentic fashion. The registration of “Alright, Alright, Alright,” (Reg. Nos. 7995951 and 8070191) as sensory marks, specifically, has the potential to represent a tactical shift in celebrity rights management. By securing federal trademark protection for the specific sound and motion of his delivery of the phrase, McConaughey attempts to move beyond the patchwork of state-level "right of publicity" laws. A federal trademark registration provides nationwide constructive notice of McConaughey’s ownership and creates a legal presumption that his distinct mannerisms and delivery of the phrase serve as source identifiers for the registered Class 09 goods and Class 41 entertainment services, which constitute his on-screen performance. In the context of AI, this allows his legal team to pursue infringement claims under the Lanham Act against entities using AI voice clones or deepfakes to endorse products. Unlike a right of publicity claim, which often requires proving the appropriation of one's "likeness," a trademark claim focuses on consumer confusion; specifically, whether an AI’s use of the catchphrase falsely suggests McConaughey’s sponsorship or approval. However, relying on trademark law to police AI has significant limitations. The primary hurdle is the "commercial use" requirement; trademark laws are designed to prevent consumer confusion in the marketplace, not to protect personal dignity. Consequently, this registration may be ineffective against non-commercial AI generations, such as artistic deepfakes, memes, or satire, which may be protected by the First Amendment or the doctrine of Fair Use. Ultimately, the scope of protection offered by these new registrations may be narrow. While McConaughey can now vigorously enforce against an AI creation saying “alright, alright, alright," this specific registration offers little recourse against an AI model mimicking his voice to say anything else. Infringers could potentially bypass this protection by simply creating AI content that avoids his registered catchphrases while still exploiting his vocal timbre and mannerisms. While this registration adds one weapon to his arsenal, it is likely a specific deterrent rather than a comprehensive shield against unauthorized digital exploitation.
January 26, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Embedded Videos — Fair Use or Infringement? What the Latest Court Decision Means for Publishers
In early December 2025, the Southern District of New York issued a decision in Level 12 Productions, LLC v. Mediaite, LLC. The holding highlights a growing risk for publishers and businesses that use embedded social media content in their online publications – a widely used practice among a multitude of media companies. This case concerns two videos created by journalist Brendan Gutenschwager, both of which are owned by Plaintiff Level 12 Productions. Defendant Mediaite embedded these videos in articles without obtaining licenses from the plaintiff. The first video showed an anti-immigration rally outside New York City’s Gracie Mansion; the second captured celebrity couple Chrissy Teigen and John Legend walking through a protest at a White House Correspondents’ Dinner. Mediaite’s use of the latter video also included commentary by pundit Megyn Kelly during the playing of the video. Both videos were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. Mediaite argued that its embedding of these videos did not constitute infringement under the Ninth Circuit’s “server test” and claimed its use was fair use. The Ninth Circuit’s “server test” doctrine holds that a website does not infringe when it embeds protected material hosted on a third-party server, because the site never creates or stores a copy of the work. Instead, a user’s browser is merely directed to retrieve it from its original source. In other words, embedded video is considered to be equivalent to linking to a source rather than a public display as defined by the Copyright Act. The Second Circuit has previously declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s server test in prior disputes involving similar uses of embedded video. Judge Vargas followed the Second Circuit’s precedent, rejecting the server test and reaffirming that embedded video constitutes a public display under 17 U.S.C. § 101 even if the content itself is hosted on a third-party server. Regarding fair use, the court reached different conclusions for the two videos. In video one, the court did not overturn the lower court’s holding, which found no fair use. For video two, however, the court held that Mediaite’s use was fair, since Mediaite embedded the copyright-protected video in a manner featuring Megyn Kelly’s commentary on the same, and thus the copyright-protected material was effectively transformed. The fact that media publishers cannot rely on the Ninth Circuit’s server test in the Second Circuit, while not surprising, remains significant, as it limits publishers’ ability to embed media in online publications without a license. On the other hand, this holding does little to affect either Circuit’s application of highly contextual fair use analyses. Courts will still look for a transformative purpose to establish that a use is fair. For publishers and media outlets, the takeaway is clear: audit your embedding practices and treat embedded social media content as you would any other copyrighted material. When in doubt, secure a license, especially if the embedded content is central to your story but not the subject of commentary.
January 9, 2026
Trademark and Copyright
Termination Rights Under Scrutiny in Harper Lee Adaptation Cases as USCO Steps In
It’s said: “you never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view,” but the Dramatic Publishing Company (“DPC”) is not so interested in considering the point of view of the Harper Lee Estate in the disputes over the rights to produce stage adaptations of Lee’s seminal work, To Kill a Mockingbird. The suits center on the exercise of termination rights under Sections 203 and 304 of the U.S. Copyright Act, invoked by Harper Lee in 2011 to terminate the exclusive right granted to DPC in 1969 to create and license amateur stage adaptations of the novel, and whether a derivative work created prior to such a termination may continue to be licensed by the licensee. The Lee Estate seeks to terminate Lee’s 1969 grant of dramatic rights, however DPC argues that its adaptation constitutes a lawful derivative work created prior to the effective date of termination, thereby preserving its continued exploitation rights under the derivative works exception to Sections 203 and 304. This conflict places the parties at odds, in both the Second and Seventh Circuits, over the scope of the termination right and the durability of licenses which permit the creation of derivative works, pre-termination. The U.S. Copyright Office (“USCO”) weighed in on April 15, 2025, by amicus brief, saying “Terminate all the rights you want, but it’s a sin to expand a derivative post-termination.” Addressing the core legal issue, the USCO supported a narrow reading of the derivative works exception, warning that an expansive interpretation would erode the statutory policy underpinning termination rights. The brief emphasizes that post-termination exploitation of derivative works should be confined to uses that do not alter or expand upon the original derivative work, and that new derivative post-termination uses should remain unauthorized. The brief thus urges the courts to adopt an interpretation that protects the integrity and utility of Sections 203 and 304. This position reinforces the principle that termination rights are intended to give authors and their heirs a meaningful opportunity to renegotiate or reclaim control of their works. Note that Section 203 of the Copyright Act does not cut off the right of a former licensee to exploit lawfully created derivative works. Instead, the law specifically allows the continued use of derivative works prepared before the termination date. The termination only reverts the licensed rights to the original copyright owner and prevents the creation of new derivative works after the termination date. The result of these suits may drastically limit an author’s ability to control the use of derivatives versions of their works, provided such works were created during the original grant period. While we do not know when we can expect the Seventh and Second Circuits to issue their decisions, rest assured we will provide an update at that time. The USCO’s amicus brief echoes the rationale they employed when confirming their final rule regarding termination rights of songwriters under the Music Modernization Act in July 2024, which further reinforces the narrow interpretation of the derivative works exception advocated in the brief. While the rule addresses royalty distributions for, specifically, musical works (as opposed to other copyright-protected works), its underlying principle, that post-termination exploitation must not expand upon pre-existing derivative works, applies in this Harper Lee dispute. Here, DPC’s continued licensing of stage adaptations arguably constitutes an expansion of the original derivative work, especially if new productions introduce changes or reinterpretations. The Office’s rule affirms that termination rights are meant to restore meaningful control to authors and their heirs, and that derivative works created under an original grant should not serve as a perpetual license to innovate or profit post-termination. The principle underlying the USCO’s July 2024 rule lends weight to the Lee Estate’s position and may influence how courts assess the scope of permissible post-termination uses.
December 1, 2025
Commercial Litigation
D.C. District Judge Narrows Case Between E-Commerce Giants, Temu and Shein
In December 2023, Temu (operated by Whaleco Inc.), a general e-commerce platform specializing in drop-shipping resale goods sold at deep discounts, filed suit against Shein, a similarly structured fast-fashion clothing manufacturer. In their suit, Temu alleged that Shein perpetuates a "mafia-style" scheme to monopolize the fast-fashion market through supplier intimidation, trade secret theft, and abuse of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Temu claimed that Shein coerced Chinese suppliers, who provide the overwhelming majority of Temu’s inventory, into filing over 33,000 allegedly baseless copyright takedown notices on Temu’s website in order to disrupt Temu's operations. Shein countersued in August 2024, accusing Temu of encouraging sellers to infringe intellectual property rights, stealing Shein's trade secrets and product designs, and operating a counterfeiting-reliant business model. This battle between Shein and Temu reached a critical moment on September 30, 2025 when a district judge in the District of Columbia dismissed key claims of plaintiff Temu, while allowing Temu’s intellectual property claims to proceed. This recent ruling proved a strategic victory for Shein. The court dismissed Temu's antitrust claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, ruling that the alleged anticompetitive conduct occurred in China and fell outside U.S. jurisdiction. The court dismissed Temu's trade secret claims for similar reasons, as the alleged theft of trade secrets occurred overseas. However, the court left Temu's intellectual property claims intact, finding that Temu adequately pleaded infringement of its trade dress by Shein, direct copyright infringement related to Temu’s promotional mobile phone games, and violations of DMCA Section 512(f) for knowingly issuing false copyright takedown notices. This case underscores critical challenges for companies operating in global e-commerce markets – especially as international drop shipping business models become increasingly ubiquitous. In particular, U.S. courts have faced increasing difficulty addressing allegedly anticompetitive conduct by overseas entities whose actions may still be felt in the U.S. Meanwhile, such actors continue to misuse DMCA takedown procedure to gain a competitive edge in the market rather than as an IP protection tool. As both companies face broader regulatory scrutiny worldwide (Temu recently paid $2 million to the FTC to settle INFORM Consumers Act violations), this case may influence how courts evaluate jurisdictional questions in international supply chain disputes and assess claims of DMCA abuse in competitive marketplaces.
October 27, 2025
Sports Entertainment and Media
From Cameo to Courtroom: George Santos’ Copyright Claims Fall Flat
Despite the best efforts of the government, George Santos refuses to leave the public eye – for now, at least. On September 15, 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of former Congressman George Santos' copyright infringement and state law claims against late night show host and comedian, Jimmy Kimmel, as well as the Walt Disney Company. The case arose from Kimmel's use of personalized videos on his late-night show, Jimmy Kimmel Live! that Santos created through the Cameo platform. Kimmel and his staff submitted paid requests to George Santos through the popular app, Cameo, in which notable public individuals record and send personalized messages in exchange for money. Kimmel proceeded to air these recordings on his late-night show as part of "Will Santos Say It?" segments, which mocked Santos' willingness to create content for money. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Fair Use doctrine barred the copyright claims, while the state law claims for breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and fraudulent inducement either failed on the merits or were preempted. On the copyright claims, the Second Circuit conducted a thorough fair use analysis under 17 U.S.C. § 107, focusing primarily on the transformative nature of Kimmel's use of the materials for satirical purposes. The court rejected Santos' argument that the use wasn't transformative because Kimmel had "instigated" the videos' creation, emphasizing that transformativeness is judged by what a reasonable observer would think rather than the subjective intent of either party creating the work at issue. The court found Kimmel's use was clearly transformative commentary and criticism, noting that while Santos claimed Kimmel’s purpose in soliciting the recordings was also to mock Santos and demonstrate Santos’ willingness to say absurd things for money, a reasonable observer would view the videos as conveying "feelings of hope, strength, perseverance, encouragement, and positivity." The court also found no harm to the market, since Kimmel's use didn't usurp Santos' market by offering a competing substitute. As for Santos’ state claims, the court affirmed their dismissal on substantive grounds. Santos' direct breach of contract claim failed because he was not considered a party to Cameo's Terms of Service and could not establish third-party beneficiary status under Illinois state law, which requires implied terms to a contract to be "so strong as to be practically an express declaration." His implied contract claim failed under New York law for not pleading essential contractual terms or demonstrating a meeting of the minds. Finally, his fraudulent inducement claim failed because he could not allege actual out-of-pocket losses as required under New York law. While Kimmel could have relied on commentary under Section 107 of the Copyright Act as a non-infringing use, this case reaffirms the power that satire also has to transform a work under the Fair Use doctrine. While deceit may not endear one to the deceiver, neither will it necessarily endanger them in a court of law (depending on the use, of course).
October 17, 2025
Intellectual Property
OK Alert | Understanding the FTC’s New “Click-to-Cancel” Rule
Businesses that automatically charge their customers on a recurring basis may have to update their practices to comply with new consumer protection regulations. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has introduced a new “click-to-cancel” rule that places stricter requirements on negative option programs—business models that require customers to actively cancel or opt out to stop recurring charges. Common iterations of negative option programs include free trials that roll into paid subscriptions, recurring delivery services, automatic renewals, and similar continuous service agreements. While these programs offer convenience for consumers and predictable revenue for businesses, the new rule comes as a response to persistent consumer allegations of unfair and deceptive practices in some negative option programs. The FTC’s new “click-to-cancel” rule requires: Transparency: All program terms (billing frequency, total costs, how to cancel, etc.) must be disclosed clearly and conspicuously. Businesses cannot bury this information in fine print or hard-to-find sections of their websites or agreements. Consent: Businesses must obtain explicit, informed consent from consumers before collecting billing information and should retain these consent records for at least three years. Ease of cancellation: Canceling must be as easy as signing up, with no hidden barriers or cumbersome processes. In short, this rule aims to ensure consumers know what they are signing up for. Businesses must now clearly disclose the program terms, secure consumer consent before billing, and make it straightforward to cancel. When to comply: Exact dates for compliance have not been announced yet. The rule will begin to take effect 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register. Various provisions will also have staggered compliance dates, making the timeline more complex. Additionally, there are lawsuits challenging the rule that could lead to potential delays or pauses in implementation, adding further uncertainty. It may be advisable to consult with a lawyer on your specific compliance needs. Insights and best practices: Even if the rule is delayed or does not take effect, there are business advantages to proactive compliance. The practices defined in the “click-to-cancel” rule—clear terms, consent, and an easy cancellation process—address common consumer frustrations. Implementing transparent business practices can help you build consumer trust and goodwill, a quantifiable business asset. More information: The FTC announced the “click-to-cancel” rule in a press release on October 16, 2024. The full proposed text for the final “click-to-cancel” rule can be found here: Final Rule Concerning Recurring Subscriptions and Other Negative Option Programs, 16 CFR part 425. The following week, industry groups began challenging the FTC’s new “click-to-cancel” rule in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. On October 22, 2024, Electronic Security Association v. FTC (24-60542) was filed in the 5th Circuit and Michigan Press Association v. FTC (24-3912) was filed in the 6th Circuit. Offit Kurman will continue monitoring developments surrounding this new rule.
November 4, 2024
Intellectual Property
Supreme Court Limits First Amendment Protection in Trademark Parody Case
Decision Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, No. 22-148 (U.S. 2023). This month, the Supreme Court clarified the interplay between the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of expression and the Lanham Act’s protection against trademark infringement in a case that dealt with a manufacturer of dog toys modeled off of famous liquor bottles. In Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. v. V.I.P. Products L.L.C., No. 22-148 (U.S. 2023), the Supreme Court ultimately held that when analyzing the propriety of the use of another's trademark, the critical question is whether the trademark is being used for "source identification"—i.e., to communicate the maker, manufacturer, or creator of the work in question. If so, then there is no threshold First Amendment inquiry and an infringement claim can proceed as usual, regardless of whether the use of the trademark had been intended as a parody. Background of Case Jack Daniel's is a case about "dog toys and whiskey," Justice Kagan writes in the very first sentence of the Court's opinion. The dispute began when V.I.P. Products began manufacturing a dog toy primarily modeled after the famous Jack Daniel's Whiskey bottle called "Bad Spaniels." Although the toy largely borrowed the trappings of the iconic Jack Daniel's bottle and label, it altered the words "Jack Daniel's" to "Bad Spaniels," "40% ALC. BY VOL" to "43 percent poo," and "Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey" to "Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet." The toy also disclaimed that it was "not affiliated with Jack Daniel's Distillery." Shortly after the Bad Spaniels chew toy hit the market, Jack Daniels demanded V.I.P. cease its sale. Rather than comply, V.I.P. sought a declaratory judgment in the District Court of Arizona, asserting: (a) it was protected from an infringement claim under the First Amendment according to the test set out for artistic works in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (adopting a two-pronged threshold test for the Lanham Act to apply: (1) determining whether use has "artistic relevance"; and (2) if so, whether the use is "explicitly misleading" as to the source or content of the work); and (b) it was protected from a dilution claim because the toy was a parody and qualified as fair use under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). Jack Daniel's countersued, asserting trademark infringement (based on consumer confusion) and dilution. Lower Court Decisions At first, the District Court rejected V.I.P.'s arguments. It held that because the use of Jack Daniel's trademark identified the alleged source of V.I.P.'s product, First Amendment protections did not apply. The district court also refused the parody defense to dilution for essentially the same reason—i.e., the exclusion did not apply when the use of the mark identified the source of the alleged diluter's product. After a bench trial, the district court found “consumers were likely to be confused about the source of the Bad Spaniels toy and that the toy’s negative associations with dog excrement (e.g., “The Old No. 2”) would harm Jack Daniel’s reputation.” The Ninth Circuit reversed. The appellate Court determined the threshold First Amendment Rogers test did apply "because Bad Spaniels is an expressive work" and "communicates a humorous message." In addition to remanding the case on the infringement claim, the Court of Appeals also rejected the dilution claim, reasoning that since the work "parodies and comments humorously on Jack Daniel's," it was protected under the "exclusion for noncommercial use" per 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C). On remand, the District Court applied the Ninth Circuit’s analysis and granted summary judgment in favor of V.I.P. on the infringement claim. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the second judgment, the Supreme Court accepted Jack Daniel's appeal on the infringement and dilution claims. The Supreme Court’s Decision Reversing and remanding, the Supreme Court largely agreed with the District Court's original analysis. Generally, it held that the threshold First Amendment Rogers test does not apply when someone uses a trademark as a trademark—that is, to identify the source of a product. In so doing, the Court provided several examples to help explain when trademark use is source-identifying versus when it is used to convey another expressive function. For example, the band Aqua's use of Mattel's trademark "Barbie” in the song "Barbie Girl" did not speak to the song's origin but was used to promote a message of positive body image. Another example is the use of "Louis Vuitton" in the film The Hangover: Part II, where a character uses the mark to describe his luggage but mispronounces the name. The use was to convey something about the character – he wants to be seen with the luxury brand but doesn't know how to pronounce its name. These marks were not used to identify the source of the goods but to perform another expressive function, and the Rogers test would apply. On the other hand, when the use "at least in part [is] for source identification," as here where V.I.P. has used trademarks and trade dress derived from Jack Daniel's registrations as a designation of the source to promote its products, then the First Amendment Rogers does not apply because the "defendant may be trading on the goodwill of the trademark owner." For similar reasons, the Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit's decision about the noncommercial exclusion to dilution for "parody" and "fair use." Ultimately, the Court held that neither the First Amendment nor the “noncommercial exclusion” exception to liability applied. Thus, the lawsuit was remanded for further proceedings. Key Takeaways Brand owners have kept a close watch on Jack Daniels, as many were concerned that the Court would significantly expand the immunizing power of parody and humor in trademark infringement cases, allowing a potential infringer to dodge litigation by invoking Rogers. The Court's decision quells those fears. By drawing a clear line under the applicability of the Rogers test in disputes involving trademarks that contain expressive elements, the Court upheld the central ten-ant of trademark law: those using a mark that is similar to or evokes another's trademark as a source identifier to promote its goods or services will be subject to the likelihood of confusion inquiry under the Lanham Act, even if the use is in parody or overtly humorous. The First Amendment considerations do not create a safe harbor for those who trade on the goodwill of another's trademark to gain an advantage. To be clear, the Court's holding does not eviscerate the role of parody. Jack Daniel's only makes the Rogers test unavailable as an escape hatch to achieve a summary dismissal of the infringement action. Satire remains a viable defense in the context of a standard likelihood of confusion inquiry. As the Court noted, "a parody is not often likely to create confusion. Self-deprecation is one thing; self-mockery, far less ordinary." In sum, Jack Daniels refocuses the inquiry on the likelihood of consumer confusion. Companies are encouraged to consider these considerations as they evaluate new trademarks or trade dress during product and brand development. This summary of legal issues is published for informational purposes only. It does not dispense legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship with those who read it. Readers should obtain professional legal advice before taking any legal action.
June 23, 2023
Intellectual Property
Navigating the New NIL Landscape: A Checklist for Athletes Looking to Profit
On June 30, 2021, the college athletics landscape was significantly altered, as the NCAA announced an “interim policy” concerning the commercialization of college athletes’ names, images and likenesses (“NIL”). NIL includes an athlete’s name, appearance, signature, nicknames and any other signs, slogans, sayings or symbols that can be used to identify that individual. Here is a basic step-by-step guide to help college athletes profit from their own NIL while complying with NCAA, state and school rules: (1) Know the interim NCAA policy. Athletes can now profit from NIL. State law where the school is located will apply. The school’s rules will also apply, even if there is no state NIL law. You can hire professional representation (attorneys, agents) with certain limitations. You must report NIL activities consistent with state law and school rules. Avoid NIL affiliation with NCAA’s banned sub-stances (drugs, performance-enhancing drugs, etc.). (2) Does your state have an NIL law? If so, know it. In order to play the game, you have to know the rules. Therefore, start by learning about your state's NIL law. If you are unsure, contact your athletic department or a local attorney for guidance. What are the “banned categories” in the state (drugs, alcohol, gambling, etc.)? What are the reporting requirements? What makes someone eligible to help you with NIL deals (state agency requirements)? (3) Know your institution’s NIL policy. You must know what your school does and does not allow. Can you use the school’s logo or facilities in your NIL activities with or without pre-approval? Is there a process to request approval to use school logos and facilities? Can you conduct NIL activities during team-sanctioned events? What are your school’s “banned categories”? Are there special NIL social media rules? Does your proposed endorsement conflict with the school’s existing product agreements? What are the school’s NIL reporting requirements? Does your school have a designated NIL administrator to help you? What is the enforcement mechanism and ap-peal procedure if you make an alleged NIL mistake? (You should consider hiring professional representation to help avoid this.) (4) Protect your NIL. If you are in the market for significant NIL deals, you should consider protecting your intellectual property (“IP”). Seek legal counsel with experience in both IP and sports law. The initial consultation will typically be at no cost. Beyond that, a small expense up front can pay off down the road. Register your IP. Register your name, nickname, or slogan as domain names. Protect your right to use your own NIL and prevent unauthorized third-party use by filing for trademark protection. What is a trademark? It is a word (name or nickname), symbol, design or slogan that can specifically identify you in commercial activities. Consider hiring a trademark attorney to assist you. How do I determine if it is cost-effective to take these steps? The NIL market is extremely new and, therefore, tough to judge. However, the more substantial contracts are being executed by players with larger social media followings and on-field presence. Regardless, do NOT sell yourself short. Test the market and see what deals you may attract. (5) Understand the impact of any earned income. Earning income from NIL may affect your personal financial situation, including your tax status and liabilities, your immigration status, and/or your financial aid package. (6) Seriously consider hiring professional representation. In accordance with NCAA, state and school guidelines, consider obtaining professional representation, such as an attorney or agent registered in the state. Also, consider whether obtaining financial, tax, immigration or other professional advice would be helpful. At the end of the day, no NIL deal is worth your NCAA eligibility or institutional good standing. This summary of legal issues is published for informational purposes only. It does not dispense legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship with those who read it. Readers should obtain professional legal advice before taking any legal action.
September 13, 2021
Intellectual Property
A Checklist for University Policies Addressing Student-Athlete Name, Image and Likeness (NIL) Issues
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Alston v. NCAA, the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") issued an interim policy announcing that it will no longer enforce its rules prohibiting compensation for the use of a student-athlete's name, image and likeness ("NIL"). Other athletic associations have like-wise amended their bylaws to allow student-athletes to profit from the use of their NIL. Additionally, new laws recently enacted by many states, such as Pennsylvania, now require institutions of higher education to publish policies on these issues. To comply with NCAA rules and state law, universities face a range of somewhat complex considerations in forming and implementing NIL policies and procedures. Here are some of the key issues in the form of a practical checklist: Know the NCAA policy or the policy of the athletic association that governs your institution's teams. The NCAA has a Division Manual for each of its three divisions. The Manuals are several hundred pages long and include at least several dozen policies that address issues that may be impacted by NIL activity. These manuals and policies have not yet been revised. Instead, the NCAA's interim policy states simply: "Individuals can engage in NIL activities that are consistent with the law of the state where the school is located. Colleges and universities may be a resource for state law questions. Individuals can use a professional services provider for NIL activities. College athletes who attend a school in a state without a NIL law can engage in NIL activity without violating NCAA rules related to name, image, and likeness. State law and schools/conferences may impose reporting requirements." https://www.ncaa.org/about/taking-action Know what hasn't changed in the NCAA manuals. Subject to state law, the NCAA still prohibits a "NIL agreement without quid pro quo (e.g., compensation for work not performed)." Subject to state law, the NCAA prohibits "NIL compensation contingent upon enrollment at a particular school." Subject to state law, the NCAA still prohibits "compensation for athletic participation or achievement. Athletic performance may enhance a student-athlete's NIL value, but athletic performance may not be the 'consideration' for NIL compensation." Subject to state law, the NCAA still prohibits "institutions providing compensation in exchange for the use of a student-athlete's name, image or likeness." https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_QandA.pdf (See Q. 11) Know your state's NIL law. A majority of states have enacted brand-new NIL laws, and the requirements vary considerably. Some states even require that institutions create funds from ticket sales or other promotional activities to benefit athletes. Pennsylvania's new law contains many provisions similar to those in other states. For example: Pennsylvania's law applies to institutions within Pennsylvania and to students participating in intercollegiate athletics at those institutions. The laws of other states may also apply to their residents regardless of where they attend school. 24 P.S. §20-2001k, et seq. Pennsylvania's law permits college athletes to earn compensation for the use of the athlete's NIL and provides that the compensation must be commensurate with the market value of the athlete's NIL. Pennsylvania's law prohibits college athletes from accepting compensation in exchange for their attendance, participation, or performance at the institution ("pay-for-play"). Pennsylvania's law prohibits college athletes from earning compensation for NIL use "in connection with a person, company or organization related to or associated with the development, production, distribution, wholesaling or retailing" of the following: Adult entertainment products and services. Alcohol products. Casinos and gambling, including sports betting, the lottery, and betting in connection with video games, online games, and mobile devices. Tobacco and electronic smoking products and devices. Prescription pharmaceuticals. A controlled, dangerous substance. Other products or activities prohibited by the institution. Pennsylvania's law also permits institutions to prohibit student NIL use more broadly: (i) in activities that conflict with existing institutional sponsorship arrangements and (ii) based on other considerations that conflict with institutional values, as defined by the institution. The Pennsylvania law requires institutions to have policies that "specify the name, image or like-ness activities [in] which the college student may not engage." Pennsylvania's law requires students to disclose proposed NIL contracts to a designated official of the institution at least seven days before the execution of the contract. Pennsylvania's law prohibits institutions (i) from preventing student-athletes from earning compensation through the use of the student's NIL or (ii) from obtaining professional representation in relation to NIL use. Pennsylvania's law prohibits institutions from arranging third-party compensation for a student-athlete relating to NIL use as an inducement to recruit prospective students. Pennsylvania's law requires any person producing a college team jersey, video game, or trading card for profit to make a royalty payment to each athlete whose NIL or "other individually identifiable feature" is used. Pennsylvania's law does not require institutions to facilitate or enable NIL opportunities for athletes. The law specifically states that it does not require an institution to permit athletes to use the institution's marks, logos, mascots, or other intellectual property. Know your state's student-athlete agency law. Many states, including Pennsylvania, require registration, which may include payment of fees and posting of bonds. See, e.g., 5 Pa.C.S. §3301 et seq. Tell the students where to find a list of "banned products." Pennsylvania's law requires that institutions disclose to students the types of deals that the institution prohibits. Therefore, institutional policies should let students know which products and activities are prohibited by state law and by institutional decree. For example, should student-athletes be permitted to engage in NIL activity for CBD and hemp products? Nutritional supplements? Guns? Professional sports teams? Gambling? Broadcasters? Can they contract with university entities, such as a meal service? Institutional policies should also specify products that conflict with school contracts, such as institutional sponsorship deals that include exclusivity promises. Policies should let students know whether all teams have a conflict or just certain teams. Is certain activity prohibited on social media? Tell students whether and how they can use the school's copyright materials (including game footage, logos, nicknames, mascots, etc.), and if appropriate, how to get permission to do so. Consider requiring all vendors, whether involved through the student NIL process or otherwise, to seek approval in the same way for the use of school marks. Tell students whether they can use the school's facilities and fields for NIL purposes, and if so, how to get permission to do so. Tell students whether NIL activity can interfere with class time or team activities. Warn students of other potential hazards, including: The need to consult with the designated school official for international students (because many students are in the United States on visas that prohibit employment), and The need to consult with the financial aid office (because a successful NIL venture may result in income, which may need to be included in determining income-based financial aid eligibility and awards). Indeed, before rolling out an NIL policy, it might be a good idea to coordinate with the university's financial aid office and international student office. Require disclosure of student-athlete NIL contracts. Pennsylvania law requires disclosure to the institution of all NIL contracts at least seven days prior to the execution of the contract. In other states, some institutions are establishing dollar amount thresholds. Your policy should clarify what happens in the event the institution is unable to respond in a timely manner. Does a failure to respond mean that the student has the institution's approval to proceed? Create a formal process for disclosure of NIL deals by student-athletes and review by the school. Many schools may find it helpful to designate an NIL coordinator. Consider requiring all agents representing student-athletes for NIL activities to register with your school and to provide basic information. Consider advising students of the need to comply with NCAA rules regarding agents, including that students "shall be ineligible… if the individual enters into an oral or written agreement with an agent for representation in future professional sports negotiations that are to take place after the individual has completed eligibility in that sport." NCAA Manual, Div. 1, 2021-22, bylaw 12.3.1.3. Consider providing education to students about (a) the NIL and agent registration laws, (b) protecting intellectual property, (c) financial acumen, and (d) university policies and procedures. Consider an internal appeal process or grievance process for NIL issues. Consider other policies and documents that may require review and revision: School contracts containing licensing provisions. Will the school be responsible for student NIL disputes with a university vendor? Insurance policies. Will the university's insurance respond if there are disputes? Social media policies. Student forms granting the university permission to use the student's NIL in connection with university promotional activity. Student discipline policies which may need to specifically identify the types of discipline that may be assessed on students who violate NIL rules. Student grievance policies. Do existing policies allow students to file complaints if the institution prohibits a proposed NIL contract or fails to respond to a proposed contract? Takeaways. Institutions of higher education must create policies to inform student-athletes of their rights and responsibilities and consider updating related rules across the full range of inter-connected issues within the institution. Institutions must be prepared to make further updates as additional guidance becomes available and as rules change.
September 13, 2021
Intellectual Property
Summer School for Intellectual Property
Universities Must Prepare Student-Athlete Endorsement Policies in Response to New NCAA Rules On June 30, 2021, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) officially adopted a uniform interim policy suspending previous NCAA name, image and likeness (“NIL”) rules for all incoming and current student-athletes in all sports. The move would allow athletes in all NCAA divisions to profit from endorsements, their signatures, public appearances, and other business ventures for the first time in over a century. Background College student-athlete’s ability to receive full compensation has been at the forefront of statutory, litigation and political initiatives for the last several years. In addition to the class action antitrust lawsuit that culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in NCAA v. Alston, several states have taken legislative action to address student-athlete endorsements. California’s Fair Pay to Play Act passed in 2019 and is set to become effective on January 1, 2023. New Jersey’s NIL law will become effective in 2025, but efforts are underway to move up that date. Indeed, several other states have also taken up the baton with more immediate effect: similar endorsement laws in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and New Mexico already went into effect on July 1, 2021. The NCAA’s Board of Governors had previously proposed expanding its NIL rules in April 2020, but the Divisions failed to take action. Apparently, the abrupt implementation on June 30, 2021, of the new interim policy was likely prompted by the recent outcome in Alston, along with concerns that the state-by-state approach could give rise to further litigation and complications for recruitment and compliance. The NCAA has signaled that this expansive new policy is only temporary and that it intends to pursue a federal solution with Congress that would provide clarity on a national level. The New Rules The new NCAA policy provides the following guidance to college athletes, recruits, and member schools: Individuals can engage in NIL activities that are consistent with the law of the state where the school is located. Colleges and universities may be a resource for student-athletes regarding state law questions. College athletes who attend a school in a state without an NIL law can engage in this type of activity without violating NCAA rules related to name, image and likeness. Individuals can use a professional services provider for NIL activities. Student-athletes should report NIL activities, consistent with state law or school and conference requirements, to their university. Additionally, students are allowed to sign with agents or other professional representatives to help them acquire endorsement deals with the following caveat – students cannot stipulate that the agents would represent them in future negotiations outside of the NCAA. Some restrictions still remain in effect. NIL compensation cannot be contingent upon enrollment at a particular school, nor can the school compensate an athlete in exchange for the use of the student’s NIL. Compensation for athletic participation or achievement, or pay-for-play, remains prohibited, as affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NCAA v. Alston. Next Steps for Colleges and Universities The change in NCAA policy means that higher education institutions nationwide will have to accelerate their response over this summer in time for the fall athletic season. Such preparation may be especially important, as the NCAA policy encourages student-athletes to turn to their schools for information about their state’s NIL law. Schools in states that have adopted NIL laws may have the benefit of such state rules as a guideline, but all schools will have to confront some common issues: Whether to permit the student-athlete to use the school’s trademarks in endorsements and, if so, what kind of reasonable restrictions should be put in place? Would the school require an approval process for the endorsements? How do the NIL rules affect the school’s other policies (for example, its social media use policy) or the school’s existing relationships with sports retailers? What new resources should be made available to help the school and the students navigate the legal and compliance issues related to student endorsements? While some schools, such as Louisiana State University, will allow students to use its official logos and facilities in endorsements so long as the athletes ask for written permission, not all schools will adopt such a broad policy. Schools may want their policies, training, and related communications on this issue to reflect possible complications and disputes. For example, how will the school approach a situation where a student enters into an endorsement agreement for products or approach that could give rise to further litigation and complications for recruitment and compliance? The NCAA has signaled that this expansive new policy is only temporary and that it intends to pursue a federal solution with Congress that would provide clarity on a national level. For this summer, at least, schools have their hands full with a significant intellectual property homework assignment. This summary of legal issues is published for informational purposes only. It does not dispense legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship with those who read it. Readers should obtain professional legal advice before taking any legal action.
July 6, 2021
Intellectual Property
What Does the Future Hold for College Athletics after the Supreme Court Decision in NCAA v. Alston?
On June 21, 2021, the United States Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston. The long-anticipated decision affirmed the injunction against NCAA rules that limited the education-related benefits schools may offer student-athletes. But perhaps equally as important as the majority decision is the concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh. BACKGROUND Current and former student-athletes in men’s Division I FBS2 football, and men’s and women’s Division I basketball brought a class-action claim against the NCAA and eleven Division I conferences, alleging that their agreement to restrict the compensation colleges and universities may offer the student-athletes who play for their teams violated the Sherman Anti-trust Act. The District Court’s March 2019 ruling enjoined the NCAA from enforcing “rules limiting the education-related benefits schools may offer student-athletes—such as rules that prohibit schools from offering graduate and vocational scholarships.” However, the District Court decision also allowed the NCAA to maintain its rules limiting athletic scholarships to the full cost of attendance and restricting compensation and benefits unrelated to education. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the injunction took effect in August 2020. SUPREME COURT DECISION On appeal, the Supreme Court only considered the injunction’s legality. The Court unanimously held that “[t]he district court’s injunction is consistent with established anti-trust principles” and that the NCAA’s compensation restrictions were “properly subjected to antitrust scrutiny under a ‘rule of reason’ analysis.” The Court determined that: First, “the NCAA enjoys ‘near complete dominance of, and exercise[s] [monopoly] power in, the relevant market’” of “athletic services in men’s and women’s Division I basketball and FBS football.” As a result, the NCAA and its member schools are able to “restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.” Second, while the NCAA was concerned that the injunction would result in “micromanagement” of its business, the Court noted that the injunction applies only to the NCAA’s rules “limiting the education-related benefits” that conferences or schools may offer student-athletes. Relaxing these restrictions will not “blur the distinction between college and professional sports,” and the NCAA can achieve the “same procompetitive benefits” by significantly less restrictive means than its current rules provide. Finally, because the injunction applies only to the NCAA and multi-conference agreements, the Court reasoned that the injunction both leaves the NCAA with “considerable leeway” and leaves the individual conferences and their member schools “free to impose whatever rules they choose.” With this in mind, the Court upheld the injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing its rules limiting education-related benefits that conferences and schools may provide to student-athletes, including those rules limiting scholarships for graduate or vocational school, payments for academic tutoring, and paid post-eligibility internships. These education-related benefits could not “be confused with a professional athlete’s salary.” The Court also held that the NCAA may continue to limit cash awards for academic achievement, but only if those limits are no lower than the cash awards currently allowed for athletic achievement (currently a maximum of $5,980 per year, but the NCAA is free to reduce the amount). To the extent the NCAA is concerned that schools might exploit the injunction to give student-athletes “unnecessary or inordinately valuable items” that are only nominally related to education, the Court held that the NCAA can specify and enforce “rules delineating which benefits it considers legitimately related to education” and forbid questionable benefits. Finally, the NCAA and its member schools can propose a definition of “compensation or benefits related to education,” and the NCAA is free to regulate how conferences and schools provide them. TAKEAWAYS Alston may bring student-athletes one step closer to receiving full benefits for their services. Looking forward, Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion may give hope to student-athletes that further ground can be gained on this issue. Justice Kavanaugh directed his attention to the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules and suggested that they also “raise serious questions under the antitrust laws.” He found that these rules should also be scrutinized under “rule of reason” analysis, “absent legislation or a negotiated agreement between the NCAA and the student-athletes.” In such a case, Justice Kavanaugh leaves little doubt about how he would rule: The NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America . . . Price-fixing labor is price-fixing labor . . . No-where else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of anti-trust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different. The NCAA is not above the law. Alston and the threat of potential future litigation may spur the NCAA to negotiate an agreement with conferences and schools, or even with student-athletes if they become unionized, out of concern that another court will use “rule of reason” analysis to dismantle its remaining compensation rules or otherwise “micromanage” its business. A negotiated agreement would at least allow the NCAA to maintain some control over whether any of its remaining compensation rules remain intact. The NCAA may also explore other options to achieve more robust compensation for student-athletes, including further expansion of the rules on how student-athletes may use their name, image and likeness beyond the NCAA Board of Governors’ proposed rules from April 2020. Read the Court’s ruling in Alston here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf. This summary of legal issues is published for informational purposes only. It does not dispense legal advice or create an attorney-client relationship with those who read it. Readers should obtain professional legal advice before taking any legal action.
June 28, 2021
